Justice for Hire: Improving Judicial Selection by unknown
JUSTICE FOR HIRE
Improving Judicial Selection
A Statement by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development
A SHARED FUTURE
REDUCING GLOBAL POVERTY
A Statement by the Research and Policy Committee
of the Committee for Economic Development
JUSTICE FOR HIRE
Improving Judicial Selection
A Statement by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development
                  Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Justice for hire : a statement on national policy by the Research and Policy Committee of
the Committee for Economic Development.
   p. cm.
ISBN 0-87186-146-1
  1. Judges—Selection and appointment—United States. I. Committee for Economic
Development.  Research and Policy Committee.
KF8776.J87 2002
347.73'14—dc21
2002073639
First printing in bound-book form: 2002
Paperback: $15.00
Printed in the United States of America
Design: Rowe Design Group
COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
261 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016
(212) 688-2063
2000 L Street, N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 296-5860
www.ced.org
iii
CONTENTS
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CED STATEMENTS ON NATIONAL POLICY iv
PURPOSE OF THIS STATEMENT vii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
Summary of Recommendations 4
Appointment-based Selection 4
Improving Judicial Elections 5
CHAPTER 2: STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION SYSTEMS: AN OVERVIEW 8
The Changing Character of Judicial Elections 10
The Old Style of Judicial Campaigns 10
The New Style of Judicial Campaigns 11
Increased Competition 12
Rising Expenditures 13
Sources of Contributions: The Role of Lawyers 16
The Expanding Role of Interest Groups 17
Summary 20
The Effects of Judicial Elections 20
Effects on Judicial Behavior 22
Effects on Public Perceptions 23
CHAPTER 3: IMPROVING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 25
End Partisan Elections and Lengthen Terms of Office 25
Elections Should Be Publicly Funded 26
Improving Disclosure of Issue Advocacy Campaigns 29
Establish Judicial Retention Evaluation Programs and Publish Voter Guides 30
Conclusion 32
CHAPTER 4: IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION: A CALL FOR
COMMISSION-BASED APPOINTMENT 33
Establish Judicial Nominating Commissions 34
Require Periodic Review and Evaluation 35
Ensure Adequate Compensation 36
Merit Selection as an Alternative 37
Conclusion 38
ENDNOTES 40
APPENDIX 43
MEMORANDUM OF COMMENT, RESERVATION, OR DISSENT 52
OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 53
The Committee for Economic Develop-
ment is an independent research and policy
organization of some 250 business leaders
and educators. CED is nonprofit, nonparti-
san, and nonpolitical. Its purpose is to pro-
pose policies that bring about steady eco-
nomic growth at high employment and
reasonably stable prices, increased productiv-
ity and living standards, greater and more
equal opportunity for every citizen, and an
improved quality of life for all.
All CED policy recommendations must
have the approval of trustees on the Research
and Policy Committee. This committee is di-
rected under the bylaws, which emphasize
that “all research is to be thoroughly objec-
tive in character, and the approach in each
instance is to be from the standpoint of the
general welfare and not from that of any
special political or economic group.” The
committee is aided by a Research Advisory
Board of leading social scientists and by a
small permanent professional staff.
The Research and Policy Committee does
not attempt to pass judgment on any pend-
ing specific legislative proposals; its purpose is
to urge careful consideration of the objectives
set forth in this statement and of the best means
of accomplishing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive
discussions, meetings, and exchange of memo-
randa. The research is undertaken by a sub-
committee, assisted by advisors chosen for their
competence in the field under study.
The full Research and Policy Committee
participates in the drafting of recommenda-
tions. Likewise, the trustees on the drafting
subcommittee vote to approve or disapprove a
policy statement, and they share with the
Research and Policy Committee the privilege
of submitting individual comments for publi-
cation.
The recommendations presented herein are
those of the trustee members of the Research and
Policy Committee and the responsible subcom-
mittee. They are not necessarily endorsed by other
trustees or by nontrustee subcommittee members,
advisors, contributors, staff members, or others
associated with CED.
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The independence of the judicial system
is an essential component of a functioning
democracy. But the explosion of interest in,
and financial contributions to, judicial cam-
paigns raises concerns. When candidates for
judicial office are forced to raise funds and
accept donations from law firms or special
interest groups that might someday appear
before them, their impartiality is brought
into question. Even those judges who simply
confront retention elections face increased
pressure to rule in certain ways around elec-
tion time, for fear of a possible backlash at
the ballot box. In a system based on the rule
of law, these variances are unacceptable.
Justice for Hire: Improving Judicial Selection
builds on previous CED research on main-
taining and improving democratic institu-
tions in the United States. In 1999, CED pub-
lished Investing in the People’s Business: A
Business Proposal for Campaign Finance Reform.
Investing in the People’s Business took a hard
look at the problems of soft money and the
increasing influence of special interest
groups in campaign financing. One of CED’s
most influential papers to date, a number of
recommendations from this paper were in-
corporated into the reforms signed into law
in early 2002. CED also addressed the issue
of the increasingly litigious nature of our
society in Breaking the Litigation Habit:
Economic Incentives for Legal Reform (2000).
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Purpose of This Statement
An independent and impartial judiciary is
a cornerstone of our system of governance.
Our society is based on the rule of law, on the
idea that laws, democratically enacted, are the
supreme governing authority. Judges serve as
the guardians of the law. Their role is to
uphold the law and maintain the standards
needed for a properly functioning, credible,
and impartial system of justice. They sustain
the vitality and legitimacy of the rule of law by
giving it practical application, and we rely on
the exercise of their judgment and discretion
to give shape to what is at times an indetermi-
nate body of law. This judicial role is best ful-
filled by individuals who are responsible only
to the law and whose decisions are freed from
the influence of public opinion and political
pressures. 
Our adversarial legal system is predicated
on the idea that judges will serve as neutral
and dispassionate arbiters and administrators.
Litigants depend on a judge’s impartiality to
secure due process and gain a fair hearing:
judges must treat all those who come before
them similarly and must render impartial deci-
sions based solely on the facts of the matter
before them. This is the only way to guarantee
that each case is decided through a principled
deliberation with no predisposition as to the
correct legal outcome. Such independent and
impartial exercise of judicial authority is an
essential aspect of a free society, since it pro-
motes respect for the law and thereby inspires
voluntary compliance with legal norms.
The methods of judicial selection used in
most states fail to live up to this conception 
of the judiciary. Instead of safeguarding judges
from political pressures, most selection sys-
tems invite such influence by requiring judges
to gain or retain office through popular elec-
tion. There are more than 30,000 judges in
the 50 states, including more than 1,300 state
appellate judges, 11,000 state trial judges, and
almost 18,000 limited-jurisdiction judges. Over
87 percent of these judges must face the vot-
ers at regular intervals in some type of popular
election.1 Thirty-nine states currently require
elections for those seeking or holding judicial
office at some level.2 In all, 53 percent of
appellate judges and 77 percent of trial judges
are selected in contestable elections.3 Taken
together, the number of elected judges now
vastly exceeds the number of elected state 
legislators and executive officers throughout
the country.4
While the federal system of judicial selec-
tion has encouraged a popular image of 
justices as appointed officials with life tenure,
the reality in most courtrooms throughout 
the nation is just the opposite. More often
than not, those who serve on the highest state
courts and those who preside daily over mat-
ters of criminal, civil, and family law were
placed in office, or remain in office, due to a
decision made by voters. The selection meth-
ods vary widely, with some states choosing all
or most of their appellate and trial jurisdiction
judges in nonpartisan contests, while others
hold partisan contests where the candidates
stand for election on a party ticket. Elections
have also become common in many states 
that employ “merit selection” systems, which
were originally designed to respond to the
problems posed by judicial election. In these
1
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merit systems, a candidate is initially appoint-
ed to office and then required to stand for
election after a specified term in order to
retain office. These retention elections do not
require a judge to face an opponent; instead,
voters are asked to vote “yes” or “no” on the
question of whether that judge should be kept
to serve another term. Only 11 states select
judges through appointive processes or merit
systems without elections.5
The need for judges to appeal to voters
and seek campaign contributions to finance
their quests for office is antithetical to the
ideal of an independent and impartial judicia-
ry. Unlike governors, legislators, or even city
councilors, judges are not supposed to repre-
sent a particular constituency, appeal to a
majority, or even reflect the will of the people.
Yet the desire to be elected or reelected may
lead a judge to consider public attitudes or
the electoral consequences of a decision in
rendering a judgment. At a minimum, selec-
tion by election enhances the potential influ-
ence of political considerations on judicial
behavior and increases the prospect of a politi-
cization of the courts, since any decision a
judge makes may be made into a campaign
issue by an opponent or interest group in the
next election. This is especially true in parti-
san contests, where an elected judge may be
perceived by members of the electorate as an
adherent to a particular policy view or political
perspective. 
The need to solicit campaign contribu-
tions poses an even greater threat to the inde-
pendence and legitimacy of the judiciary. The
necessity of raising money for a political 
campaign encourages judicial candidates to
engage in an activity that does not befit the
decorum of the office and is not conducive 
to the building of public trust in the judicial
process. Accepting campaign money can cre-
ate the appearance of obligation to those who
financially supported a judge’s bid for office.
In the worst case, it may subject a judge to
outside influence and affect a ruling or lead 
a litigant to conclude that a donor received
preferential treatment. Any process that
selects judges by election jeopardizes public
confidence in the judicial process. The need
to raise money for election campaigns severe-
ly exacerbates this problem.
The problems inherent in judicial elec-
tions have become especially acute in the past
two decades. The character of judicial con-
tests in a growing number of states has
changed dramatically. While most judicial
elections continue to conform to the tradi-
tional pattern of low-cost, civil affairs, with rel-
atively low voter interest, many judicial races
have become fierce electoral battlegrounds.
Indeed, the more competitive judicial con-
tests are now indistinguishable from guberna-
torial and legislative contests, and they exhibit
many of the problems associated with modern
political campaigns.
The costs of judicial campaigns are rapidly
escalating. In some states, judicial candidates
must raise $1 million or more to gain or keep
their seats on the bench. These rising costs
force judicial candidates to place greater
emphasis on fundraising and encourage these
candidates—or their campaign committees—
to raise money just like other politicians. To
solicit the sums required to be competitive,
judges often have to rely on attorneys and law
firms as principal sources of funds, which
increases the possibility of the appearance of
undue influence and creates the impression
that justice is for sale. 
The rising costs of judicial elections are 
in part the result of greater competition, but
they are also a function of changes in cam-
paign conduct. Competitive judicial elections
have become highly politicized and partisan
contests. They often feature broadcast adver-
tising campaigns designed to communicate
misleading or critical attacks on a judge’s past
decisions, or issue advertisements that are
designed to elevate the salience of a single
issue as a means of shaping voter opinion.
This kind of campaigning can place judicial
candidates at a distinct disadvantage. 
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Because of the nature of the judiciary,
states have regulated the campaign behavior
of judicial candidates to prevent these candi-
dates from engaging in activity deemed inap-
propriate. These codes of conduct place
restrictions on the content of campaign com-
munications and specifically prohibit a judi-
cial aspirant from making pledges or promis-
es of conduct in office or any statements that
“commit the candidate or appear to commit”
the candidate to certain positions or decisions
with respect to controversies that are likely to
come before the court.6 Consequently, judi-
cial candidates are often limited in their abili-
ty to respond to attacks launched by outside
interests in their election campaigns. This
serves to discourage the robust level of politi-
cal debate that is needed to facilitate reason-
able voter decisions. 
However, the legality of these codes has
been challenged in the Supreme Court. In
June 2002, the Court struck down Minnesota’s
statute, a ruling that renders similar laws in
eight other states unenforceable.7  This ruling
promises to have a negative impact on the
tone of judicial elections. Contests will
become even more combative, and judicial
races will take on more of the character of
elections for political office. The risk of pre-
judgment on issues that may come before a
court will increase. Consequently, the inde-
pendence of the judiciary will diminish.
Freeing judicial aspirants to behave more 
like elected politicians is not a step in the
direction of improving our judicial system.
Judicial elections have also suffered from
the expanded participation of interest groups.
With rising frequency and intensity, interest
groups are exerting influence in judicial cam-
paigns, spending millions of dollars to try to
elect judges who share their views or will serve
their narrow interests. The 2000 elections
were a major landmark. Organized groups
spent unprecedented sums of money on
efforts to defeat sitting judges. In many
instances, these groups carried out their cam-
paigns by relying on “issue advocacy advertise-
ments,” advertisements that are not subject to
campaign finance restrictions because they do
not expressly advocate the election or defeat
of a candidate, so that they could spend
unlimited amounts of unregulated funding in
their efforts to change the composition of the
courts. Their intervention in these elections
substantially altered the dynamics of these
races, and allowed these groups to have a
meaningful effect on the election outcomes. 
The changes taking place in the judicial
selection process raise serious issues that need
to be addressed. In our view, recent judicial
elections reflect patterns that are reminiscent
of those witnessed in congressional elections
in the early 1980s. In a growing number of
states, judicial races are evidencing an “arms
race mentality” of rising expenditures, height-
ened competition, and growing interest group
activity. Judicial selection is thus becoming a
political process that places pressure on
lawyers, business organizations, and interest
groups to get involved in the competition 
to elect judges who will be favorable to their
positions. 
As business leaders, we are alarmed by
these developments. The dispensation of jus-
tice must not be a function of such a subjec-
tive factor as who serves as judge. But this is
the direction in which the current system is
heading. This poses a grave risk to all citizens,
since the quality of justice in any one state can
affect citizens in every state. For example, a
class action brought in one state can include
members of the class from around the coun-
try. Any particular case thus can determine the
rights of litigants in many other states. Groups
who are successful in electing judges whom
they consider to be favorable to their views
can focus their litigation efforts in these states
in an effort to improve their prospect of a
favorable decision. A logical response, given
this possibility, is for opposing parties to join
in the fray to elect favorable judges. Legal 
disputes can thus quickly become political 
disputes. Litigation may thus be determined
more by influences outside of the courtroom
3
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than on the facts of a case and the precepts 
of the law. 
Methods of judicial selection can thus have
a major effect on business and the transac-
tions that take place in the economy. Most
large corporations can be found doing busi-
ness in every state and so can be sued in any
state. Plaintiffs can choose the state court that
will be most favorable to them. The cost of 
the suit will be borne by every employee, 
customer, and stockholder, most of whom will
be residing in other states.
The effect can be even broader. Knowing
that it can be sued in whatever state court is
most favorable to plaintiffs, a multi-state busi-
ness may simply stop selling a product that
entails risk of injury (or risk of litigation); it
may require consumers throughout the coun-
try to pay more for the product; or it may be
deterred from initially putting a product out
in the marketplace at all. The judgment of
one state’s courts can determine what is avail-
able to consumers throughout the country, as
well as what it costs.
For all the considerations expressed above,
CED has concluded that elections are an inap-
propriate and detrimental method of selecting
judges. By this we do not mean that elections
are incapable of providing highly skilled and
effective judges. Indeed, CED recognizes and
appreciates the high quality and professional-
ism of many of the elected judges who now
serve on state and local courts. Rather, our
position is that elective systems tend to under-
mine the independence and impartiality of
judges. They encourage judges to engage in
political and partisan activities that do not
befit the office. They provide outside interests
with substantial opportunities to politicize
judicial decisions and influence judicial behav-
ior. They thus subvert the fundamental 
purpose that constitutes their underlying
rationale: to promote public faith in the 
legitimacy of the judicial process. 
SUMMARY OF
RECOMMENDATIONS
We urge public officials, business leaders,
judges, members of the legal profession, and
community leaders in the states to join togeth-
er to help educate the public on the impor-
tance of an independent judiciary and the
problems inherent in a system of judicial elec-
tion. We call upon these leaders to take action
to initiate reforms that would eliminate judi-
cial selection by election, whether in the first
instance or through retention elections.
Because we recognize that such a fundamental
transformation of the judicial selection
process is not likely to occur quickly, we also
recommend a number of reforms that can be
adopted in the interim to improve judicial
elections. While these reforms will not resolve
the perverse influences of elections on the
judiciary, they will mitigate their most danger-
ous effects.
CED strongly believes that appointment
should be the basic principle that governs the
selection of all judges. We therefore recom-
mend that all states select judges through an
appointment-based process.*
Appointment-based Selection
Appointment avoids the threat to judicial
independence inherent in elections. It facili-
tates a more deliberative and thorough assess-
ment of the qualifications of judicial candi-
dates than that which takes place in the con-
text of a political campaign. It also opens judi-
cial positions to a broader pool of qualified
candidates, because selection is not limited to
those who choose to face an election. 
Specifically, we recommend that states
adopt a commission-based appointment 
system. In this approach, each state would
establish a nonpartisan, independent judicial
nominating commission that would be 
responsible for recruiting, reviewing, and 
recommending eligible nominees for judicial
office. Our conception of the role of a nomi-
4
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*See memorandum by EDMUND B. FITZGERALD
(page 52).
nating commission is based on those that are
currently operating in 24 states. All appoint-
ments to judicial positions would be made
from the lists of candidates prepared by the
commission. We believe that this approach will
allow for a dispassionate and thorough review
of the qualifications and abilities of judicial
aspirants, and minimize the influence of polit-
ical considerations in the selection of judges. 
Any system of judicial selection must
include appropriate mechanisms for holding
judges accountable for their performance in
office. The requisites of a democratic society
demand that a selection process balance judi-
cial independence with accountability. This is
particularly important in an appointive selec-
tion process, since it lacks what most citizens
consider to be the principal means of holding
judges accountable: a vote of the public.
To facilitate periodic review and evaluation
of judges, we call for the creation of judicial
performance evaluation commissions, similar
to those now found in six states. All judges
should serve for a limited term of office. At
the end of this term, an independent judicial
performance evaluation commission would
conduct a comprehensive, objective review of
a judge’s performance in office and prepare
an evaluation report and a recommendation as
to reappointment. This information would be
provided to the governor or other appointing
authority in a state for use in making a deci-
sion on reappointment. 
Commission-based evaluation has proven
to be an effective means of holding judges
accountable for their performance in office.
We suggest that these commissions also con-
duct mid-term reviews of judges as a means of
assisting judges in gauging their efficacy and
offering guidance for self-improvement.
Commission evaluations would provide a
source of independent and objective informa-
tion on judges that is far more comprehensive
and unbiased than the narrow, often single-
issue based assessments that are common in
election campaigns. Performance-based
reviews would make a valuable contribution in
enhancing deliberations on reappointment
decisions. 
We further note that the efficacy of a com-
mission-based appointment system depends
on the availability of a broad pool of candi-
dates who are willing to serve as judges. While
most of the individuals who seek judgeships
do so out of a sense of service to their commu-
nity or profession, the levels of compensation
offered for judicial office can discourage high-
ly-qualified candidates from pursuing such ser-
vice. We therefore suggest that state officials
review current salaries and ensure that appro-
priate levels of compensation are provided to
judges at all levels.
We acknowledge that appointive systems 
do not necessarily guarantee the most capable
and independent judiciary. Nor do they wholly
eliminate political or partisan influence in the
selection process. But we find the merits of
this method compelling, especially when com-
pared to the procedures currently being used
in most states. In addition, we feel that an
appointive system can provide the requisite
level of accountability demanded in a democ-
ratic society, so long as appropriate safeguards
are established. 
We also recognize that those states that 
currently hold elections are not likely to
reform their systems any time soon. Numerous
bar associations, task forces, and judicial pan-
els before us have called for reform of the
judicial selection process and endorsed a
move to appointment or merit-based systems.
However, public support for elections has
remained strong; the voters are not yet willing
to relinquish their primary role in the selec-
tion process.  
Improving Judicial Elections
Accordingly, we have also considered
reforms to improve judicial elections.
Fundamental changes are needed in the way
judicial campaigns are financed and conduct-
ed if the risks presented by judicial elections
are going to be reduced. While the reforms we
offer will not resolve all of our concerns, since
5
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we regard the core problems to be inherent 
in the nature of elections, we do believe that
there are improvements that can be made to
minimize the deleterious effects of the most
pressing problems. 
We find that the most politicized and
expensive elections are those in which candi-
dates run under party labels in partisan con-
tests. This method of selection encourages the
electorate to view judges as partisan advocates
and often features substantial campaigning on
the part of party organizations or their interest
group supporters on behalf of a party nomi-
nee. We therefore strongly urge states that
hold partisan elections to end this practice.
Longer terms of office represent another
structural change that can help to reduce the
political pressures on the judiciary. All too
often, judges have to seek reelection on such a
regular basis that electoral considerations are
always close in mind. By lengthening terms of
office, judges will need to raise money and
actively campaign less frequently. Longer
terms will also lower the prospect of an elec-
tion dominated by one case or a single recent
controversial decision. We suggest as a general
rule that the length of term for trial and
appellate court judges should be a minimum
of six years and the term for justices on the
highest court in a state a minimum of ten
years. We believe that terms of this length will
provide a better balance between the princi-
ples of judicial independence and accountabil-
ity than those commonly found in current
state systems. 
No major improvement in the electoral
process will be accomplished without address-
ing the problems raised by the role of money
in judicial elections. The financial demands 
of political campaigns, especially in the most
hard-fought contests, have forced judges to
spend more time raising money and have dra-
matically increased the risk of judicial deci-
sions being subject to the influence of cam-
paign donors. The financial activities associat-
ed with judicial elections have led a growing
share of the public—and large majorities in
some states—to conclude that campaign con-
tributions do influence court decisions. The
need to raise money has thus substantially
diminished public confidence in the courts.
We are deeply concerned about this problem.
Major reform of judicial campaign finance
is needed if the legitimacy of the courts is to
be sustained. We believe that the best available
means of protecting the judicial process from
the potentially corrupting effect of private
donations is to finance these campaigns with
public monies. We therefore call for the estab-
lishment of a full public funding program for
judicial campaigns modeled on the public
funding programs now operating in Maine and
Arizona in gubernatorial and state legislative
elections. Under this approach, candidates
would be able to choose to fund their cam-
paigns solely with public subsidies. Qualified
candidates who accept public resources would
receive a full subsidy equal to the amount of a
set spending limit applicable to a given level
of judicial office. Those candidates who accept
this funding would be required to forego addi-
tional private fundraising and abide by cam-
paign expenditure limits.
We find the case for public funding com-
pelling with respect to judicial elections. In
our view, no judge should have to solicit pri-
vate donations to finance a bid for office. The
distinct nature of the judicial office and the
need for judicial independence in the admin-
istration of law demands that judges be insu-
lated from the potential influence of cam-
paign donors. The best way to achieve this
objective is to publicly fund judicial contests.
Beyond the financing of campaigns, we
also offer recommendations designed to
improve the transparency of financial transac-
tions. We call for full, effective, timely public
disclosure of election funding as an essential
element of a system of political finance. We
suggest ways that states can improve their dis-
closure regulations by making comprehensive
reports of candidate finances available to the
public and providing electronic access to
financial information. 
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Further, we recommend changes to
strengthen and expand the scope of disclo-
sure laws. We believe that disclosure should be
viewed as a responsibility of donors, as well as
candidates, when it comes to judicial elections.
Attorneys and law firms should be required to
make public any direct or indirect contribu-
tions they give to judicial candidates. Placing
the responsibility for full disclosure on these
members of the legal profession will improve
the effectiveness of disclosure regulations.
Most importantly, including indirect gifts in a
disclosure regime will discourage efforts to cir-
cumvent the rules by making contributions to
third parties that are acting on behalf of a can-
didate. Stronger disclosure obligations will bet-
ter safeguard the judicial process against
potential conflicts of interest.
We also believe that the public has a right
to know more about the monies spent by orga-
nized interests to influence judicial selection.
In many instances, interest groups or party
committees have relied on issue advocacy cam-
paigns to avoid meaningful disclosure. We
argue that these expenditures should be sub-
ject to full disclosure and set forth criteria for
determining those communications that
would be subject to such a requirement.
Finally, we advocate the adoption of judi-
cial performance evaluation commissions,
similar to those we recommend for appointed
judges, as a means of improving the informa-
tion available to voters in states that hold
retention elections. In this context, the role 
of the performance evaluation commission
would be to determine whether a judge’s over-
all performance merits a vote in favor of
retention. The commission would be responsi-
ble for publishing an evaluation report and
recommending whether the judge should be
retained. The content of this report and the
commission recommendation would then be
widely disseminated to the public through
voter guides and other means of communica-
tions for use by voters in making their voting
decisions. This reform would improve the
quality of information available to voters in
retention elections and help to balance the
often narrow focus on specific issues or cases
that has been the norm in contested retention
elections. 
A more detailed analysis and discussion of
our specific recommendations for reform can
be found in Chapters 3 and 4 of this report.
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Introduction and Executive Summary
State judicial selection systems can be divid-
ed into three general categories: appointive
systems, merit selection systems, and popular
election systems. But this simple taxonomy
fails to capture the complexity of state selec-
tion processes. Over time, each state has
adapted its approach to conform to its own
unique experience and the particular struc-
ture of its system of state courts. This has pro-
duced numerous variations, to the point
where very few states can be said to use com-
parable systems. The result is a patchwork of
procedures that in itself raises questions about
the efficacy of current methods.
The various state selection systems are 
rooted in our historical experience and reflect
different responses to the issue of judicial
independence and accountability that contin-
ue to inform public debate. 
In framing a government under the
Constitution, the founders of our republic
adapted the model inherited from England
and established a judiciary appointed for
terms of good behavior, with nomination by
the President and confirmation by the Senate,
and removable by impeachment. They
opposed the election of judges because of
their belief that judicial independence could
only be achieved if justices were insulated
from the influence of public opinion and the
will of the legislature. They defended their
choice by noting that a judiciary independent
of the people and its representatives was need-
ed to achieve the purposes of law and preserve
the democratic values that our new nation
espoused. An independent judiciary would
provide steady and consistent administration
of the law. It would be a better safeguard for
individual liberties against the actions of
majorities in society or government that might
infringe on rights of individuals or groups.
And it would be a more effective check on the
power of government.8 They thus set forth the
principal arguments that have informed the
case for appointed justices ever since.
In the early years of the republic, states
selected judges in a manner similar to that
called for in the Constitution.9 In all, the first
29 states to enter the union adopted non-
elective variations of the federal appoint-
ment process to select most of their judges,
although in eight of the original 13 colonies
the power of appointing was bestowed upon
the legislature, not the chief executive, per-
haps to enhance the “democratic” aspects of
this authority. 
With the rise of Jacksonian Democracy,
states began to move towards elected judges.
This shift was supported by the argument that
elections were needed to ensure the account-
ability of the judiciary to the people; other-
wise, justices would be responsive only to the
politicians or bureaucrats responsible for their
appointments. The change also reflected the
notion that the people are the source of all
authority in government and would have
more respect for an elected judiciary. 
Only 11 states (ten of the original 13 and
Hawaii) now hold no judicial elections
(excluding probate judges, which are elected
in four of these states). In these states, judges
are appointed, usually with the assistance of a
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nonpartisan judicial nominating commission
that develops a list of candidates. Judges are
typically appointed to serve for a limited term
of office, after which time their performance
is reviewed and a decision is made whether to
recommend them for reappointment. There
are, however, major variations. In Rhode
Island, for example, high court judges are
appointed for life, while in Massachusetts they
serve until age 70. 
By the early twentieth century, elected judi-
ciaries were criticized by some progressive
reformers “as plagued by incompetence and
corruption.”10 In the view of these critics, elec-
tions compelled judges to become politicians
and thus undermined the legitimacy of the
courts.11 These concerns gave rise to the merit
selection system of selection, also known as
the “Missouri Plan” for the first state to adopt
it, which called for the nomination of state
judges by a nonpartisan nominating commis-
sion, the appointment of judges for a limited
term by a high elected official from the com-
mission’s list of nominees, and a subsequent
unopposed retention election to determine
whether a judge should be retained. This 
system was endorsed (and still is) by the
American Bar Association in 1937 and was
subsequently adopted in a large number 
of states. 
Thirty-nine states hold some sort of elec-
tion for judges at some level. Elections are
used to elect all appellate and general-jurisdic-
tion judges in 18 states. Nonpartisan elections
are used in 12 states to select all judges and in
seven others to select some judges. Partisan
elections, which require candidates to run on
a party line, are used in six states to select all
judges and in ten other states to fill some judi-
cial positions. These partisan states include
Michigan, Ohio, and Idaho, where candidates
appear on the ballot without party labels, but
their selection and campaigns are otherwise
partisan. Five states seek to reduce the influ-
ence of partisan politics by holding their elec-
tions in “off-periods” to create some separa-
tion from the more prominent federal and
state elections that attract the highest voter
interest. Pennsylvania, for example, holds 
judicial elections at the time of municipal 
elections in odd-numbered years, while
Tennessee votes on judges on the first
Thursday in August of even-numbered years.12
Some version of the merit selection system
with retention elections is used in 19 states for
at least some judges. The systems vary widely.
For example, in California, the Governor rec-
ommends names of prospective candidates to
a nominating commission, which reviews the
qualifications of these nominees, instead of
the nominating commission offering candi-
dates to the governor, as is the case in most
states. In Illinois and Pennsylvania, judicial
candidates are first elected in partisan contests
and then run for reelection in retention con-
tests. What is common to these states is the
use of retention elections to determine
whether a judge will remain in office. 
Besides calling for different kinds of elec-
tions, state procedures set forth varying terms
of office. Among elected appellate judges,
about 45 percent have six-year terms, 16 per-
cent have eight-year terms, and the remaining
38 percent have terms of ten years or longer.
General-jurisdiction trial judges serve even
shorter terms, on average, with 19 percent fill-
ing four-year terms, 62 percent having six-year
terms, and only 13 percent elected to terms 
of ten years or longer.13 Overall, most judges
have to run for reelection or retention fairly
regularly. 
This brief summary provides some idea of
the diverse methods now being used to fill
state courts, and the emphasis that is placed
on popular election. But it is important to
note that, in practice, the methods employed
are not as distinct as this summary suggests.
While some sort of election is clearly the pre-
dominant means of placing judges in office,
many judges are initially chosen through an
appointment process rather than popular
vote, even in those states that mandate elec-
tion. It has become common in many states
for judges to retire before the end of a term,
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which provides the governor with an opportu-
nity to make an interim appointment. A
recent survey conducted by the American
Judicature Society of 11 states that hold elec-
tions found that more than half (53 percent)
of the 1,929 judges at all court levels in these
states were initially appointed to the bench to
fill interim vacancies before running in an
election.14 The selection of judges in states
requiring election is thus not simply a pure
electoral process, just as merit selection sys-
tems are not a purely appointive process.
Instead, most states employ what is best
described as a “mixed system” that combines
aspects of appointment and election. 
THE CHANGING CHARACTER 
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
The 2000 elections represented a “water-
shed” in judicial elections, due to the unprece-
dented amounts of money spent in judicial
races and the fierce competition that took
place in a number of high-profile state
supreme court contests.15 These races shared
the traits that have come to define so many
other political campaigns—a rising tide of
campaign money, an emphasis on television
advertising, and a predominance of negative
campaigning. The 2000 elections signal that
our nation is beginning to witness a new era in
judicial electioneering. The changes taking
place are substantially altering the context of
judicial elections and reflect the culmination
of a number of trends that have been 
witnessed over the past two decades. In this
section of the report, we highlight some of the
major factors that are shaping the new politics
of judicial elections.
The Old Style of Judicial Campaigns
Traditionally, judicial elections were low-
visibility, modestly-contested civil affairs that
were conducted with the decorum and dignity
that befits a judgeship. Campaigns for judge-
ships were low-cost endeavors, in which the
candidates raised modest sums or, not uncom-
monly, virtually no money at all. Most judicial
candidates conducted grassroots campaigns in
which they would speak to groups interested
in their candidacies or disseminate literature
to make their names known to voters. The 
vast majority of races were uncontested, so the
candidates did not have to mount substantial
campaigns in order to be elected or retained.
In many cases, candidates simply relied on
party support or typical voting patterns to 
gain election. Even where candidates did cam-
paign, the races attracted little attention from
voters. Indeed, low voter awareness and a 
relatively small number of votes cast were a
standard feature of judicial contests.
Given this low level of intensity and relative
lack of competition, it is not surprising to find
that these contests usually produced high
retention rates and little turnover. One
detailed analysis of all state supreme court jus-
tices in 42 states who served between 1960 and
1992 found that turnover in elections was so
low that the method of selection made little
difference with respect to either the turnover
of judges or their length of tenure in office.
While partisan elections produced the highest
turnover rates and merit selection systems the
lowest, the differences between the two were
not statistically significant.16 Similarly, a study
of retention elections held between 1964 and
1998 found that only 52 of the 4,588 judges
facing retention votes during this period were
defeated. In addition, a majority of those 
who were defeated were running in Illinois
where 60 percent of the vote is required to be
retained.17 The study, however, did show that
in those instances where a judge was defeated,
some personal characteristic associated with
the candidate, such as a controversial opinion
he or she had issued, was a key factor in deter-
mining voting patterns.
In most states, judicial contests continue 
to reflect these traditional characteristics,
especially in the case of retention elections.
Candidates wage modest campaigns in a 
political environment in which voters have 
little awareness of the qualifications of the
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candidates or their records. Consequently,
voter turnout is relatively light. 
This low level of participation is partially a
function of the long ballots that are needed in
states where a large number of judicial candi-
dates are running. As the length of the ballot
increases, the number of individuals who actu-
ally cast a vote for candidates listed further
down the ballot decreases. For example, in
Cook County, Illinois, the 2000 election ballot
featured four state supreme court justices,
nine appellate judges, and more than 150 trial
judges.18 More broadly, an analysis of retention
elections held throughout the states from
1976 to 1996 determined that 30 percent of
those who cast votes at the top of the ticket
did not cast ballots for the judges up for reten-
tion.19 A sizable share of judicial races there-
fore continue to attract little voter attention 
or interest. 
The New Style of Judicial Campaigns
The traditional patterns in judicial elec-
tions began to shift in the late 1970s and early
1980s.20 During this time, certain judicial con-
tests became more intensive and expensive,
and the dynamics of judicial elections irre-
versibly changed. 
Perhaps the most prominent example of
the emerging shift was the 1978 retention
election in California for Chief Justice Rose
Bird. Justice Bird’s liberal rulings from the
bench on such controversial matters as capital
punishment galvanized opposition in her
retention election. This led to a combative
and hard-fought campaign in which her sup-
porters and opponents spent a combined total
of at least $643,000. Bird won by the narrowest
of margins, 51.7 percent of the vote, which led
her opponents to mount a recall campaign in
1982 that cost at least $870,000.21 The battle
over Bird’s retention continued into 1986,
when Bird and two colleagues were chal-
lenged again. The three justices raised a sub-
stantial sum of money, but lost. In all, the two
sides spent $11.4 million.
Other elections soon followed suit, leading
to a number of contentious, high-cost judicial
races in several more states. In the early 1980s,
campaign funding became a major issue in
Texas judicial campaigns. In 1982, for exam-
ple, Texas Supreme Court candidate William
Kilgarlin financed his unsuccessful $485,000
campaign primarily with contributions from
lawyers who represented accident victims. His
opponent, incumbent Judge James Denton,
raised $161,000 in part from funds solicited
from lawyers that represented insurance com-
panies. Another Texas judicial candidate
accepted $200,000 from a rancher who had
faced a number of lawsuits.22 Contributions to
judicial candidates in other states also began
to be questioned, including a particularly con-
troversial instance in Pennsylvania, which
involved contributions from an attorney whose
law firm was in the midst of representing the
Pennsylvania Coal Mining Association in a
case pending before the court.23
In other states, the conduct of campaigns
became an issue. In a New York judicial race
in 1983, the controversy revolved around cam-
paign messages. The election featured radio
ads that alleged “mob influence” on certain
candidates and “Wall Street domination” of
judges, as well as the claim of “organized
crime picking and fixing judges.”24 In North
Carolina, the Chief Justice was attacked in
both 1986 and 1990 for his decisions to
reverse a handful of death sentences. In Ohio
and Alabama, races for seats on the high court
began to be hotly contested and therefore
increasingly expensive, as plaintiffs and
defense interests began to use these races as
arenas for pursuing the objectives of business-
es and those who seek to file claims against
them.25
By the mid-1990s, judicial elections in
other states had begun to demonstrate that
the races in California, Texas, Pennsylvania,
Alabama, Ohio, and North Carolina were not
anomalies, but harbingers of things to come. 
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The amounts raised and spent by judicial can-
didates, at least in the most competitive races,
were on the rise, and elections were becoming
more contentious. At least insofar as can be
determined from the available evidence, a sub-
stantial number of judicial elections were turn-
ing into contests characterized by increased
competition, higher levels of spending, a
growing reliance on funding from practicing
attorneys, and expanding interest group 
activity.
Increased Competition
Judicial elections have become more com-
petitive. A growing number of candidates are
willing to contest sitting judges, especially in
those cases where a judge has issued opinions
that can be used to mobilize opposition or is
otherwise considered to be at risk of losing. A
number of factors have contributed to this
trend.
Judicial elections are not immune to the
broader changes in the political and electoral
landscape. One reason why judicial elections
are more competitive is that all elections in a
number of states have generally become more
competitive. This is especially true in the
South. The demise of one-party dominance 
in some states has put an end to electoral envi-
ronments in which most of the competition
took place in Democratic Party primaries. In
Texas, for example, the success of Republican
candidates in the 1980s, including the winning
presidential campaigns of Ronald Reagan and
George Bush, as well as other Republican vic-
tories in state gubernatorial races and contests
for federal office, helped to improve the
prospects of other Republican candidates
seeking office. This led to a greater number 
of successful Republican candidates for judi-
cial offices and, in turn, to more competitive
judicial elections.26
Competition has also been spurred by the
role of the courts and their influence on con-
troversial public policy issues. Courts have
assumed a more active role in our society as 
a result of the trend towards more litigation
and the willingness of those involved in 
legal disputes to take matters to court.
Consequently, courts are more involved in poli-
cy issues than they were decades ago, and are
increasingly asked to rule on disputes over par-
tisan and polarizing issues, such as the death
penalty, reproductive rights, school funding,
and tort reform. Furthermore, this rise in judi-
cial activism in policy decision-making extends
to areas of litigation and tort actions that have
significant implications for the economic and
political interests involved, whether they be
corporations or consumer groups, insurance
companies or plaintiff’s attorneys, single issue
organizations or public interest groups. Many
sectors of society can therefore have a stake in
judicial decisions, and many individuals and
organizations are willing to pursue their inter-
ests by playing a role in the selection of judges.
Supreme court elections have become
lightning rods for political controversy and
serve as a vehicle for politics by other means.
The legal disputes heard in the courtrooms
are often continued in judicial elections.
Recent supreme court races have featured
heated debates on such issues as the death
penalty, reproductive rights, environmental
regulation, and school funding questions. The
predominant issue in recent years, however,
has been tort reform. For example, tort
reform was the dominant issue in the 2000
Alabama Supreme Court elections. In May of
1999, an Alabama jury ordered a company to
pay three plaintiffs $580 million in punitive
damages and $970,000 in compensatory dam-
ages for defrauding a family out of $612 on
the financing for a satellite dish. The legisla-
ture responded to this decision by enacting a
new tort reform law that included caps on
damages. Because the court had declared tort
reform legislation enacted in 1987 unconstitu-
tional, the business community was concerned
about the view the court would take of the
new statute. In an effort to secure approval for
the law, the business community mobilized to
support the Republican candidates seeking
positions on the high court, and the elections
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produced a 5-to-4 Republican majority, even
though Democrats held the governorship and
easily won control of both houses of the legis-
lature.27
Similarly, tort reform was a focal point in
the Michigan, Illinois, Mississippi, and Ohio
Supreme Court races in the 2000 cycle. The
races in Ohio were especially combative, since
the high court had ruled against business
interests on tort reform legislation and work-
men’s compensation matters by 4-to-3 majori-
ties. Justice Alice Resnick, a Democrat, had
authored the 1999 opinion that struck down
the tort reform law, which required a cap on
noneconomic damages and placed a time
limit on the filing of malpractice suits. The
plaintiffs in the case were the Ohio AFL-CIO
and the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers.
Justice Resnick therefore became the principal
target of an aggressive campaign that pitted
business organizations against the plaintiff’s
bar.28 In this instance, Justice Resnick with-
stood the assault on her record and was
reelected, but only after enduring a blistering
negative advertising campaign that drew
national attention due to the derogatory con-
tent of the ads, including one advertisement
that alleged that the justice’s decisions were
influenced by campaign contributions from
trial lawyers.
Increased specialization within the legal
profession has tended to exacerbate the politi-
cizing of judicial elections and thus further
enhanced competition. In races for positions
on civil courts, civil plaintiffs’ lawyers and
members of the civil defense bar are likely to
support different candidates. In races for 
positions on criminal courts, prosecutors and
members of the criminal defense bar are likely
to support different candidates. Personal
injury lawyers are likely to be at odds with
attorneys who represent businesses or profes-
sional organizations. This encourages the
recruitment and support of candidates, 
which can lead to more challengers and 
more competitive races. 
While many candidates still seek judicial
office without having to face a serious chal-
lenge, or run in retention elections that
attract little notice, the level of competition 
in judicial contests has clearly increased. A
recent survey conducted by the Center for
American Politics and Citizenship at the
University of Maryland offers an indication 
of just how competitive judicial contests may
have become. The survey sampled candidates
from 29 states and defined a competitive elec-
tion as a race in which the successful candi-
date received between 40 percent and 60 per-
cent of the vote. The findings, which excluded
retention elections, revealed that 44 percent
of the candidates were involved in competitive
contests, while 27 percent were not competi-
tive and 29 percent were uncontested. The
report noted that this represented a “remark-
ably high level of competition,” especially as
compared to historic norms, and suggested
that judicial elections “are even more competi-
tive than elections for the U.S. House of
Representatives [where only 35 percent of 
the races were competitive in 1998] and most
state legislatures.”29
Rising Expenditures
As competition increases, so does spend-
ing. But the dramatic growth in judicial cam-
paign spending cannot be attributed to com-
petition alone. Substantial sums of money are
now needed to gain a seat on many of the
nation’s highest courts. And the money chase
in judicial races may just be getting started.
The 2000 elections saw a dramatic surge in
candidate spending across the country, which
suggests that the trend towards more expen-
sive judicial campaigns will continue to esca-
late in the future. 
While high levels of spending are not yet
the norm in judicial elections, there is mount-
ing evidence that expensive campaigns are the
new reality in many state supreme court races
and other high-profile contests. The grassroots
efforts of the past have given way to profes-
sional campaigns that rely on paid consultants,
polling, and broadcast advertising. A new
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Table 1
Receipts of Competitive Pennsylvania Supreme Court Candidates, 1979-97 
(in 1997 dollars)
Candidates Total $ Primary Primary General General
Yeara & Vacancy raised Mean total mean totalc meanc
1979 4 for 1 613,900 153,475 598,127 149,532 15,773b 15,773b
1981 6 for 2 1,549,033 258,172 899,045 149,841 618,998 154,642
1983 5 for 1 1,170,380 234,076 1,170,380 234,076 —b —b
1989 3 for 1 2,817,901 939,300 931,048 310,349 1,886,852 942,686
1993 6 for 1 3,076,362 512,727 1,752,339 292,057 1,324,024 662,012
1995 7 for 2 4,535,075 647,868 1,504,072 214,867 2,963,921 710,980
1997 4 for 1 3,090,878 772,720 1,284,598 321,150 1,806,280 903,140
a.  No vacancies existed in 1985, 1987, or 1991; thus no election for an open seat was conducted.
b.  One candidate captured both parties’ nomination in the primary and ran unopposed in the general election in 1979 and 1983.
c.  Total and mean expenditures are for primary winners only; a few primary losers reported modest contributions totaling $100,000
during the general election reporting period. Final sums and means reflect only contested elections.
SOURCE:  James Eisenstein, “Financing Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court Candidates,” Judicature, vol. 84, no. 1 (2000), p. 13.
political environment has forced candidates or
their campaign supporters to solicit ever larg-
er sums to finance their bids for office.
Candidates in many parts of the country feel
greater pressure to raise money due to the
intervention of party organizations and inter-
est groups in electoral contests. Spiraling cam-
paign costs are thus becoming more common,
and the trends in many states indicate that
money is just as important in judicial races as
it is in other political contests.
The growth of judicial campaign spending
can be illustrated by the experience over the
past two decades in supreme court elections 
n Pennsylvania and Texas. Between 1979 and
1997, 44 candidates ran for a seat on the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, including 35
who ran in competitive races. The total
amount raised by the four candidates vying for
a seat on the court in 1979 was about
$614,000, on an inflation-adjusted basis (see
Table 1). In 1997, the four candidates who ran
for a seat raised almost $3.1 million, or five
times as much. The average receipts of a
supreme court candidate rose from about
$153,000 in 1979 (as adjusted for inflation) 
to more than $772,000 in 1997. The amount
raised by the winning candidate grew from
$173,000 in 1979 and $201,000 in 1981, to
more than $1.4 million in 1995 and $954,000
in 1997.
Similarly, in Texas, the amounts of money
spent by supreme court candidates have risen
sharply. The average amounts raised by candi-
dates rose from $155,000 in 1980 to $1.5 mil-
lion in 1994, when the changing party dynam-
ics in the state fostered highly competitive
elections. In adjusted terms, the average rose
from about $300,000 in 1980 to more than
$1.7 million in 1994, a five-fold increase. Since
then, the amounts raised have declined some-
what, due to a lessening of competition
brought about by the strength of the incum-
bents sitting on the bench. Even so, candi-
dates in 1998 averaged more than $500,000,
while the winners averaged more than
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$800,000. These sums represent a substantial
increase over the amounts spent less than two
decades earlier.30
The experiences in Texas and Pennsylvania
are not atypical. Other state supreme court
elections indicate similar trends. For example,
in Ohio, the race for Chief Justice of the Ohio
Supreme Court in 1980 cost $100,000; six
years later, the race cost $2.7 million.31 In
Alabama, the amounts spent by supreme 
court candidates grew from $237,000 in 1986
to close to $2.1 million ten years later.32 In
North Carolina, the largest amount spent in 
a supreme court race in 1988 was $90,330; 
by 1994, that amount had increased to
$241,000.33 And this trend toward greater
spending is not confined to races for the high-
est courts. In California, median spending on
contested elections for the Los Angeles
Superior Court went from $3,000 in 1970 to
$70,000 in the early 1990s.34 In Lackawanna
County, Pennsylvania, the top three candidates
for the Court of Common Pleas spent a com-
bined $600,000, which was more than the total
amount spent by the eight candidates seeking
positions for the Superior Court, which is a
statewide office.35
More broadly, an analysis of the spending
of those candidates who raised money for a
supreme court race in recent years shows an
upward trend. The 116 candidates who raised
funds in the 1996 election cycle received an
average of about $260,000, with median
receipts of about $99,000. In the 2000 cycle,
the 110 candidates who raised money solicited
$431,000 on average, with the median amount
rising to $244,000.36
The experiences in these elections proved
to be a prelude of things to come. As the data
for 2000 indicate, judicial election spending
spiked upwards in this year, reaching levels
that represented more than a simple extrapo-
lation of prior trends. In all, state supreme
court candidates raised a total of $45.6 mil-
lion, which represented an increase of 61 per-
cent over the total received in 1998, and twice
the amount received in 1994. In a number of
states, new high-water marks for judicial
spending were established. The average
amount raised by a state supreme court candi-
date rose to more than $430,000, which was
25 percent more than the average amount
received in 1998. Candidates in the major
electoral battlegrounds averaged even higher
sums. In Alabama, supreme court candidates
averaged more than $1.2 million; in
Michigan, more than $750,000; and in Illinois
and Ohio more than $640,000. Overall, 16
judicial contenders each solicited more than
$1 million for their campaigns in 2000.37
This steep increase in judicial spending 
is largely a result of a greater reliance on 
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Figure 1
Average and Median Funds Raised by
Supreme Court Candidates, 1993-2000
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a. This data comes from surveys conducted by the Justice At
Stake Campaign. The data only includes candidates who
raised funds during the cycle in question. Generally, about
three-quarters of candidates raised funds. The exact num-
ber of candidates in each group is as follows:  
1993-94: 97 candidates, 72 raised funds;
1995-96: 156 candidates, 116 raised funds;
1997-98: 131 candidates, 95 raised funds;
1999-00: 152 candidates, 110 raised funds. 
SOURCE: Deborah Goldberg, Craig Holman, and Samantha
Sanchez, The New Politics of Judicial Elections (New York:
Brennan Center for Justice and National Institute on Money
in State Politics, 2002), p. 8.
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television advertising as a means of communi-
cating with the electorate. Judicial candidates
engaged in the most competitive campaigns
are devoting a substantial share of their cam-
paign budgets to broadcast advertising. An
analysis of supreme court candidate spending
conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice
at New York University School of Law and the
National Institute on Money in State Politics
found that between 1989 and 2000, these can-
didates spent about 25 percent of their cam-
paign budgets on media and advertising. In
2000, supreme court candidates spent an esti-
mated $6.4 million on television advertising,
all of this by candidates in the four states with
the most hotly contested elections—Alabama,
Michigan, Mississippi, and Ohio. The use of
broadcast advertising was especially intensive
in Ohio and Michigan. Television advertising
accounted for more than half of the total
expenditures of judicial candidates in Ohio,
and almost half of the spending done by 
candidates in Michigan.38
The type of election held by a state is
another factor that has a significant effect on
candidate spending. Candidates in states with
merit selection systems are required to run in
retention elections only, where they face no
opponent, but may be removed from office by
the electorate. In most cases, these candidates
perceive little risk of losing their seats, except
in the relatively rare instances in which the
election has been politicized by opposition
groups that disagree with a judge’s decisions.
In contrast, candidates in partisan elections
usually run in contested races, where they do
face opponents and voting tends to be divided
along party lines. Candidates in these elec-
tions often feel the need to spend significant
amounts of money to win the approval of 
voters. 
The relative competitiveness of different
types of elections is reflected in spending pat-
terns. Partisan elections are by far the most
expensive, and retention elections the least.
From 1990 to 2000, candidates who ran in
partisan races each raised, on average, more
than $444,000, or almost four times the
amount raised by candidates in nonpartisan
elections, who each averaged $122,000.39 If
the 2000 election cycle is considered alone,
the amounts spent were considerably higher
than these longer-term aggregates. In 2000,
partisan candidates spent an average of
slightly more than $600,000, while nonparti-
san contenders spent about $302,000. The
level of partisan candidate spending is equiv-
alent to the levels of spending found in U.S.
House races.40 In contrast, only one out of
every 16 candidates who ran in retention
elections from 1990 to 2000 even had to raise
money.41
Sources of Contributions: 
The Role of Lawyers
The rising costs of judicial campaigns
heighten concerns about the sources of candi-
date funding and the effects of campaign con-
tributions on judicial independence. These
concerns are especially pronounced when
campaign money comes from donors who may
litigate before a court or represent interests
that have a direct stake in the outcome of judi-
cial decisions. In the current system, such
sources constitute the major source of judicial
campaign money.
Unlike most other political candidates,
judges do not represent constituencies. They
cannot initiate specific policies or advocate
specific policy views that are shared by broad
segments of the electorate or hold special
appeal to particular groups of citizens. They
cannot publicly avow their views on legal dis-
putes that may come before them or commit
in advance to vote a certain way on a given
issue. They should not join with other elected
officials to pursue common political agendas,
and usually seek office independent of any
party organization. In other words, judges do
not engage in the political practices on which
most candidates for elective office rely to 
build a base of political support and appeal 
to a broad base of potential donors.
In the quest for political contributions,
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judges are also hampered by the fact that they
tend to be relatively unknown to the elec-
torate and lack popular name recognition.
Those who know them best tend to be those
who practice law or have an interest in the
workings of the court. Accordingly, a substan-
tial portion of the monies raised by judicial
candidates comes from attorneys or law firms,
or sources with a stake in a matter that is
before, or might come before, a court. The
need for judges to raise campaign money thus
increases the potential for real or perceived
conflicts of interest and enhances the possibili-
ty that judicial rulings will be considered by
the public as a response to donor influence. 
There is no uniform pattern of attorney
contributions across the states. In some states,
they constitute a large share of the monies
raised by judicial candidates; in others, they
represent only a small fraction. It appears,
however, that in those states where expensive
contests have become common, attorneys and
law firms provide about half of the money
raised by candidates. The rest comes mostly
from companies or economic groups that may
be affected by court judgments. 
For example, in Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Ohio, three of the states that have experi-
enced significant growth in the costs of judi-
cial campaigns, attorneys are the single largest
source of campaign funds. A review of more
than 23,000 contributions of $50 or more
made to Pennsylvania Supreme Court candi-
dates between 1979 and 1997 showed that 49
percent of all donations came from attorneys,
law firms, or law political action committees.42
Almost half of the money received by Texas
Supreme Court candidates between 1994 and
1998 came from lawyers and law firms, while
another 13 percent came from energy compa-
nies and 12 percent from finance, real estate,
and insurance companies.43 In Ohio, supreme
court candidates from 1993 to 1998 received
52 percent of their funds from lawyers and
lobbyists, and another 11 percent was con-
tributed by finance, real estate, and insurance
companies.44 In West Virginia, trial lawyers
were responsible for more than half of the
funding received by three of the four supreme
court candidates seeking election in 2000.45
The Expanding Role of Interest Groups
Organized interest groups are another
important source of funding and support in
judicial campaigns. Interest groups seek to use
their resources to influence the composition
of the courts, just as they seek to influence the
selection of members to the other branches 
of government. In the election context, orga-
nized groups make contributions to candi-
dates. They also independently initiate direct
mail campaigns, advertising campaigns, and
voter turnout programs to assist their favored
candidates. In addition, groups endorse candi-
dates in an effort to provide voters with a cue
that could determine their ballots. They can
therefore exert a substantial influence in judi-
cial campaigns. Their basic purpose is to elect
judges whom they believe will support their
interests.
The expanding involvement of the courts
in controversial public policy issues has provid-
ed interest groups with a strong incentive to
be more active in judicial campaigns. These
incentives were recently summarized by Judge
Paul Carrington in the context of the develop-
ments that have taken place in Texas.
Political interest groups and parties began
about 1980 to take a heightened interest in
judicial elections. In some states, tort and
insurance law moved to the top of the politi-
cal agenda for judicial elections. By 1980,
local groups of personal injury lawyers were
organized to secure the election of judges
favoring their clients. For a time, they seemed
to control elections to the Supreme Court of
Texas. Their success, however, evoked a
response from insurance companies and oth-
ers whose financial interests were threatened
by a ‘plaintiff’s court,’ and in recent years,
“habitual defendants” have been more suc-
cessful in securing the election of judges
thought to favor their interests.46
Because court rulings may affect many
issues and interests, interest groups have an
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incentive to mobilize in favor of certain judi-
cial candidates. This often provokes a counter-
mobilization by opposing groups. A diverse
array of interest groups has thus focused on
judicial contests as a vehicle for pursuing their
narrow interests. The most active participants
tend to be groups on either side of politicized
issues, including the death penalty, abortion
rights, tort reform, landowner property rights,
and a host of local issues. Some groups now
even regard the courts as their principal arena
of public policy conflict, even more so than
the legislature, providing further impetus to
their willingness to devote their resources to
these contests. 
Interest groups also have an incentive to
participate in judicial elections because they
have a distinct advantage in shaping the politi-
cal discourse in these contests. Due to the
nature of the office, judicial candidates are
not permitted the same ability to speak freely
in election campaigns as is granted to other
elected officials. Most states holding judicial
elections have adopted some form of the 1990
version of the American Bar Association’s
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which is
designed to protect the independence and
impartiality of the judiciary by placing restric-
tions on political activities deemed inappropri-
ate to the judicial office.47 These codes of con-
duct include restrictions on the content and
character of a candidate’s communications,
whether made in the form of speeches, broad-
cast advertisements, or responses to question-
naires and other public inquiries. More specif-
ically, many codes prohibit candidates from
making or issuing statements that include
pledges or promises of conduct in office,
other than the faithful and impartial perfor-
mance of the duties of the office, such as state-
ments that commit or appear to commit a
judicial candidate to certain positions or deci-
sions with respect to cases or controversies
that are likely to come before the court, or
communications that misrepresent the qualifi-
cations or positions of either the candidate or
an opponent. 
Consequently, judicial candidates are con-
fronted with an uneven playing field when
opposed by organized groups. A group could
make the claim in a campaign advertisement
that a judicial candidate would not support
the death penalty in a notorious murder case
pending before a court; a judge cannot
respond by refuting the claim and stating how
he or she plans to vote on the matter. Interest
groups therefore have a greater opportunity
to influence the agenda of public debate in
judicial campaigns than they do in legislative
or gubernatorial campaigns. This encourages
interest group participation in judicial races
that entail a vital interest.
Interest groups were especially active and
aggressive in the 2000 elections. State supreme
court contests, in particular, were notable for
the intense levels of interest group election-
eering that they attracted. These efforts often
defined the major issues in the race, and
reflected an attempt by organized groups to
influence the outcomes in particular states.
Their expenditures contributed to the high
costs in these elections, since candidates were
forced to try to match the resources being
spent against them. 
Although the candidates were responsible
for most of the spending in judicial elections,
interest groups and political party committees
organized as never before to elect “their”
judges in the 2000 contests. In the major bat-
tleground states—Alabama, Michigan,
Mississippi, and Ohio—groups carried out
television advertising campaigns designed to
supplement the advertising being done by
their preferred candidates. Most of these
efforts took the form of “issue advocacy”
advertisements—ads that did not “expressly
advocate” the election or defeat of a candidate
because their texts did not include specific
words such as “vote for” or “support.” This tac-
tic allowed interest groups to circumvent
applicable campaign finance regulations and
spend unlimited amounts without having to
disclose their expenditures or sources of fund-
ing to the public. 
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The advertising done by interest groups set
the campaign agendas in the battleground
states. In all of these races, interest groups
emphasized highly controversial, “hot-button”
political issues that became the focal point of
the campaign. In fact, the emphasis on tort
liability and reform in the 2000 elections was
largely a product of interest group advertising.
Of all the ads broadcast in the battleground
states on liability issues, about two-thirds were
paid for by interest groups and political party
committees.48 The interest group campaigning
framed the debate, thereby forcing the candi-
dates, or the parties that supported them, to
respond. 
Interest group electioneering also exerted
a major influence on the tenor of the debate
in these contests. Instead of presenting the
qualifications and credentials of those seeking
office, organized groups criticized candidates
for their views on specific issues, thereby chal-
lenging their character and impartiality. Of
the 24 separate ads sponsored by groups or
party committees, only one discussed a candi-
date’s qualifications or background. More
than 80 percent of these ads, according to
interpretive criteria established by the
Brennan Center for Justice, were “attack” ads
broadcast against particular candidates.49 This
type of negative campaigning, which is the
type of campaigning judicial codes of conduct
were designed to prevent, principally served to
tarnish the image of judges and weaken public
confidence in those judges who were placed
on the bench.
The most extensive campaign in 2000 was
the one waged by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce’s Institute of Legal Reform and its
affiliated state organizations. The Institute
mounted aggressive campaigns in judicial
races in Alabama, Indiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, and Ohio, as well as in the state
attorney general race in Indiana, at a reported
cost of at least $10 million.50 Of the candidates
the Chamber endorsed, 13 of 15 won. In
Ohio, the Ohio Chamber of Commerce ran a
television ad that challenged the integrity of
Justice Alice Resnick, who had authored a
controversial tort law ruling. The ad featured
a statue of “Lady Justice” peeking beneath her
blindfold, while piles of special interest money
tipped her scales. The ad asserted that her
support for positions advocated by trial lawyers
was linked to the contributions she had
received from attorneys in her previous race,
and concluded: “Alice Resnick. Is Justice for
Sale?”51 Here the strategy may have backfired,
since the ad itself became a central issue in
the race, and Justice Resnick won her election. 
Interestingly, the Michigan Chamber of
Commerce also participated in the Ohio race.
The Michigan organization ran newspaper
and television ads that urged Ohio businesses
to move to Michigan because “the judicial
restraint of the Michigan Supreme Court and
fair laws have helped create a healthy econom-
ic climate in Michigan.”52 In Mississippi, the
Chamber spent an estimated $958,000 on
behalf of the Chief Justice, two other incum-
bents, and one challenger. This effort led trial
lawyers to form two political action commit-
tees to oppose the Chamber’s campaign.
These committees, Mississippians for An
Independent Judiciary and Mississippians for
Fair Justice, spent a combined $312,000. The
Chief Justice, who had served for 18 years and
had never been opposed in prior elections,
lost the contest in an upset.
The Chamber was not the only interest
group active in the 2000 elections. The Ohio
race also featured electioneering by Citizens
for a Sound Economy and Citizens for a
Strong Ohio, two business-related groups, as
well as teacher and labor unions, and trial
lawyer associations.53 In Illinois, a tort reform
group, the Illinois Civil Justice League, spent
about $25,000 to run advertisements in 15
newspapers.54 In Idaho, a sitting Supreme
Court justice, who had authored an opinion
that upheld a federal reserved water rights
claim in three wilderness areas, was defeated
in an election that featured significant cam-
paigning by both the Democratic and
Republican parties, as well as the Idaho Trial
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Lawyers Association, the Idaho Christian
Coalition, and a political action committee
called Concerned Citizens for Family Values.55
Former federal judge and Congressman
Abner Mikva, commenting on the 2000
Illinois Supreme Court elections, noted that
“every special interest in the state—the insur-
ance, the defense bar, everybody—is there
with big bucks to promote their candidates.”56
This observation could be applied to a large
number of states. Interest group electioneer-
ing is a staple of competitive judicial cam-
paigns, and stands as another source of the
increasing political pressures being placed 
on judicial candidates. 
Summary
Recent election cycles indicate a trend
towards more expensive and combative judi-
cial elections. In a growing number of races,
judicial contests are defined by the practices
and patterns that have led many observers to
condemn, in general, the conduct in political
campaigns. The money flowing into competi-
tive judicial elections suggests that campaign
financing is playing a greater role in the judi-
cial selection process. The ability to raise
funds is becoming an increasingly important
aspect of a bid for judicial office, requiring
candidates, especially those in highly competi-
tive and partisan elections, to place greater
emphasis on the solicitation of campaign gifts.
While this emphasis on fundraising has not
become a predominant characteristic of most
judicial elections, current trends indicate that
big spending is on the rise and that larger
campaign coffers are going to be needed by
an expanding number of candidates. 
Candidates targeted by political groups will
feel the greatest pressure to raise money, espe-
cially if interest groups and political parties
adhere to the strategic approaches they adopt-
ed in 2000 and continue to engage in aggres-
sive campaigns to influence judicial selection.
In attempting to meet the financial demands
generated by a changing political environ-
ment, these candidates may be encouraged to
solicit even larger sums from members of the
legal profession and others who are likely to
have an interest in judicial outcomes. The cur-
rent system of judicial elections thus poses a
great risk to the independence and impartiali-
ty of judicial outcomes. Indeed, it is our view
that it is already taking a toll on the legitimacy
of the judicial process.
THE EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS
Courts are legal institutions. Judges are
expected to act on the basis of legal princi-
ples, not political principles. A judge’s role is
to serve the law, not the political forces of the
moment, and to do so in an impartial and
neutral manner. Judges are not supposed to
react to public opinion as legislators are. The
popular will is embodied in laws enacted by
political institutions—legislatures and gover-
nors—subject to the overriding constraints of
the federal and state constitutions, which may
also be determined by the public will through
the amendment process. Judges are supposed
to interpret and apply these laws with a
responsibility only to the law itself and, to the
extent not changed by statute, accepted prin-
ciples of common law. Insofar as judges aban-
don this strict adherence to law in exercising
their judgment, so do they abandon the dis-
tinctive claim that distinguishes them from
members of the other branches of govern-
ment and from other processes of dispute 
resolution.
To be effective, the rule of law requires an
independent and impartial judiciary that is
free from political influence. Selection by elec-
tion operates against this fundamental princi-
ple. Elections subject judges to political pres-
sures and electoral incentives that encourage
them to take notice of the demands of public
opinion and voter response to their positions
in the performance of the responsibilities of
judicial office. 
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Competitive election contests place pres-
sure on judges to defend past decisions and to
take positions on issues that may come before
them. In theory, judicial campaigns could be
waged on the basis of a candidate’s qualifica-
tions for office, character, or general approach
to judicial decision-making. There are judicial
elections, especially those retention elections
that attract little public attention, as well as
many of the races for lower court positions,
that are characterized by this type of dis-
course. But even these contests can necessarily
and quickly evolve into a discussion of the
specifics of how a candidate has ruled or
would rule on particular issues. A fundamen-
tal purpose of elections, after all, is to provide
the electorate with an opportunity to make a
choice of candidates “based on the issues.” 
The experience of competitive elections
has demonstrated that judicial elections, in
practice, are principally referenda on how a
candidate will decide or has decided cases, or
else a debate on specific issues that are salient
to voters. This is particularly likely when there
are strong opinions among citizens about an
opinion issued by a judge, or strong views held
by an interest group about the merits of a judi-
cial candidate. The pressure on candidates to
make their positions known is thus intensified.
Some candidates may react by deciding to
make statements indicative of their views, or
encourage surrogates to speak for them.
Elections therefore contain the threat of pre-
judgment, which undermines the objective
dispensation of justice. As the intensity of a
campaign increases, so does this risk.
The prospect of facing an election, espe-
cially a potentially divisive election, may pres-
sure judges to give greater credence to popu-
lar opinion and make it more difficult for
them to make independent and objective deci-
sions. Elected judges face the same electoral
concerns as other elected officials. It would
not be surprising to find that some judges
yield to the temptation to make decisions that
satisfy the demands of a vocal and committed
group of voters. Indeed, inherent in the con-
cept of electing judges is the idea that these
officials should in some way be accountable to
the popular will, or at least be affirmed by the
citizenry as a legitimate claimant to office. The
risk to judicial independence created by these
electoral incentives is obvious. When the need
to face the electorate does influence judges’
decisions, however marginally, the proper
administration of justice is compromised. 
Elections further diminish the legitimacy of
the judiciary to the extent that they lead the
public to question the impartiality or integrity
of judicial decisions. Elections place judicial
candidates in a public context that encourages
voters to view them as political or partisan fig-
ures. Since most citizens do not follow the
workings of the courts closely and judges
rarely receive the media exposure provided to
most elected officials, public knowledge of
judicial candidates primarily stems from the
information obtained in election campaigns.
The conduct of recent campaigns suggests
that the information the public receives is pre-
sented in highly partisan or politicized infor-
mational frameworks. Citizens are unlikely to
regard a judge as a neutral arbiter after being
exposed to television advertising campaigns
that impugn his or her character or question
the quality of previous rulings. 
Campaign fundraising presents citizens
with an even more compelling rationale for
doubting the integrity of the court decisions.
Given the large sums of money now being
raised in some judicial contests, citizens can-
not help but question the motives behind
such giving, and wonder what effect this
money might have on the behavior of judges.
These concerns may lead many citizens,
including those who come before the courts
as litigants in a case, to conclude that prefer-
ence is given to campaign donors. The need
to raise money, especially the need to raise
hundreds of thousands of dollars, is an elec-
toral necessity that severely undermines public
faith in the fairness of the judicial process.
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Effects on Judicial Behavior
The influence of elections on judicial
behavior is difficult to determine, because
judicial decisions cannot always be explained
as a consequence of any one factor. However,
the evidence that is available raises alarming
concerns about the effect of political consider-
ations on judicial opinions and brings into
high relief the detrimental aspects of an elect-
ed judiciary.
A telling acknowledgement of the effect
elections can have on a judge’s thinking was
recently made by a member of the West
Virginia Supreme Court:
As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth
from out-of-state companies to injured in-state
plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is
my sleep enhanced when I give someone else’s
money away, but so is my job security, because
the in-state plaintiffs, their families, and their
friends will reelect me…. [Indeed,] the out-of-
state defendant can’t even be relied upon to
send a campaign donation.57
A former justice of the California Supreme
Court has warned, “There’s no way a judge is
going to be able to ignore the political conse-
quences of certain decisions, especially if he
or she has to make them near election time.”58
A justice of the Supreme Court of Texas
also highlighted the dilemma under which
elected judges are forced to operate. Pointing
to the canons of judicial conduct that require
a judge to be independent and impartial,
Justice John Cornyn suggested that these
canons are “a convenient fiction in an elective
system.” He asked:
How can judges, saddled with all of the bag-
gage of political campaigning and forced to
solicit campaign contributions from lawyers
likely to practice before their courts, be said
to conduct themselves in a manner that pro-
motes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary?….[W]hile elec-
toral accountability is an unquestionably
desirable check on the official performance
of members of the legislative or executive
branches, its shortcomings as a check on judi-
cial power are exposed when it clashes, as it
inevitably must, with the judge’s unique role
in a republican form of government….
[M]oney and judges simply do not mix.59
As Judge Richard Neely has succinctly stat-
ed, “I can vouch from personal experience
that the campaign contribution problem is
extremely acute and almost impossible to 
handle.”60
These testaments to the influence of elec-
tions on judicial behavior are substantiated by
recent research, which supports the view that
elected judges must be inevitably motivated in
some degree by electoral considerations. A
number of studies suggest that justices are
more likely to acquiesce to court majorities,
due to concerns about the electoral ramifica-
tions of votes on controversial issues such as
the death penalty. In politically competitive
states where justices are chosen on partisan
ballots, justices are more likely to join court
majorities in controversial cases. In cases
upholding the death penalty or involving the
imposition of capital punishment, liberal
court members are less likely to file dissents
from conservative decisions supporting capital
punishment. By simply acquiescing and not
dissenting, justices reduce the risk that their
opinion will be a focal point of a future elec-
tion campaign, since they do not distinguish
themselves from the majority view on the
court and, in many instances, the majority
view among their “constituents.”61
A judge’s decision not to dissent from
established court majorities does not change
the outcome of a case. So, at least in these
instances, the effect of elections, although still
questionable, is mitigated. But elections also
shape voting decisions in death penalty cases.
In certain circumstances, elected judges act to
minimize electoral opposition by casting votes
that they believe conform to expressed voter
preferences. This is particularly true when
judges have previous political experience,
come from competitive election districts, and
are near the end of a term and thus about 
to face an election. This was the finding of 
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a study based on the individual votes cast by
35 state supreme court judges in 238 death
penalty decisions issued in Texas, North
Carolina, Louisiana, and Kentucky, four states
where large percentages of the public favored
the death penalty as a punishment for murder.
Even after factoring in a variety of explanatory
factors for judicial voting patterns, the study
determined that electoral factors “increased
the probability that justices will uphold death
sentences initially imposed by trial courts.” It
concluded that “concerns for reelection enter
into judicial decisions and that judicial behav-
ior reflects the pursuit of both personal and
policy goals.”62
Political influences can also shape the deci-
sions in arbitration cases. For example, a rigor-
ous analysis of arbitration cases in Alabama
courts found that “arbitration law in Alabama
seems to have no doctrinal integrity that sur-
vives the vicissitudes of the interest group bat-
tle.”63 In arbitration cases in this state, evidence
indicates that the court often splits along high-
ly partisan lines. Justices whose campaigns are
funded by plaintiffs’ lawyers are all Democrats
who oppose arbitration, while justices whose
campaigns are funded by business are nearly
all Republicans who favor arbitration. The
study established “a strong correlation between
a justice’s source of campaign funds and how
that justice votes in arbitration cases.”64
The potential influence of money on court
decisions was also the focus of recent research
on political contributions to state supreme
court justices in Wisconsin. In this instance,
every elected justice had received money
from an attorney or party who later came
before the court. Moreover, 75 percent of the
cases heard by the court between 1989 and
1999 involved a party, law firm, business, or
other organization that had contributed
money to a supreme court candidate. In most
instances, however, the sums donated were
relatively small, and whether these donations
had a material influence on judicial rulings
was not determined. Indeed, the evidence was
inconclusive: of the 29 contributors who gave
$10,000 or more, only five appeared before
the court, and their success was mixed.65
Effects on Public Perceptions
Whether campaign contributions or other
political influences shape judicial decisions is
only part of the problem judicial elections
pose for judicial independence. Just as impor-
tant, as the Wisconsin example suggests, is the
effect of political activity on public percep-
tions of the courts. With respect to justice,
appearance can become reality. The appear-
ance of improper influence can cause citizens
to doubt the impartiality of the courts and the
integrity of judges. If members of the public
believe that judges are influenced by the need
to be elected or retained, they may well doubt
the fairness of the judicial process and lose
respect for the legal system.
Not surprisingly, the monies involved in
modern judicial campaigns are fueling public
perceptions that judges are beholden to or
influenced by their contributors. These atti-
tudes may in part be a reflection of general
attitudes about the role of money in politics,
developed from the campaign finance issues
raised in other types of candidate elections or
the recent national debate on campaign
finance reform. Nonetheless, these attitudes
are becoming pervasive. 
While the general level of public confi-
dence in the judiciary remains high as com-
pared to the level of trust granted to other
government institutions, citizens display a
growing cynicism and loss of faith with respect
to the impartiality of the judiciary. For exam-
ple, a 1999 nationwide survey by the National
Center for State Courts found that nearly 80
percent of the respondents agreed that judges
are “generally honest and fair in deciding
cases.” But the survey also revealed that 81
percent agreed with the proposition that
“judges’ decisions are influenced by political
considerations,” and 77 percent believed that
“elected judges are influenced by having to
raise campaign funds.”66
Statewide surveys confirm these findings.
In Ohio, a 1995 survey reported that nine out
of ten residents believed that campaign contri-
butions influenced judicial decisions.67 A more
recent poll in Washington State discovered
that 76 percent of those surveyed thought
judges were influenced by political decisions
and 66 percent by having to raise campaign
funds.68 In Pennsylvania, a 1998 poll conduct-
ed for the state’s Special Commission to Limit
Campaign Expenditures found that 59 per-
cent of the state’s citizens felt that judicial can-
didates “spend too much money,” a percent-
age that rose to 81 percent when those sur-
veyed were told that one candidate had spent
$3 million. Encapsulating the degree to which
Pennsylvanians worry about the judicial sys-
tem, 68 percent agreed with the view that
modern campaign trends threaten “the basic
fairness and integrity of our political system.”69
Even more sobering opinions were found
in Texas, where a poll conducted by the State
Bar Association found that 83 percent of
Texans believed that campaign contributions
had an influence on judicial decisions.
Furthermore, this view was shared by those
with the most knowledge of the judicial
process. In fact, 48 percent of judges, as well
as 69 percent of court personnel and 79 per-
cent of attorneys, agreed that contributions
influenced judicial outcomes.70
These surveys may reflect misperceptions
on the part of the public. Even so, they repre-
sent a significant cause for concern. An effec-
tive judiciary depends on perceptions of its
fairness and neutrality. To the extent that
members of the public perceive the court to
be influenced by campaign contributions,
public confidence in the judiciary is eroded.
The current system yields perceptions of cor-
ruption or undue influence that need to be
addressed if the judiciary is to fulfill its pur-
pose in our democratic society. 
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The American legal system depends on an
independent and objective judiciary that
decides cases on their merits. As this report
discusses, CED believes that electing judges is
inherently incompatible with this concept of
the judiciary. Most of the litigation in this
country—perhaps as large a share as 98 per-
cent of the cases—is conducted in state
courts.71 Most of these state court judges are
either selected by popular election or face a
retention election. America is the only coun-
try that elects such a large proportion of its
judges by popular vote.72 Such a system is
inconsistent with our objective of credible,
impartial, and effective dispensation of 
justice. 
Thus, the current system of selecting state
judges is in need of fundamental reform. In
our view, the best method of promoting inde-
pendent and impartial judiciaries is to select
judges by appointive processes and eliminate
elections altogether. But we realize that such a
comprehensive reform of state selection sys-
tems will not come quickly. Elections in one
form or another will continue to be used by
most states for the foreseeable future. We
therefore recommend states that continue 
to hold judicial elections adopt a number 
of reforms that will improve the electoral
process. These changes will not eliminate the
growing political pressures judicial candidates
face, but they will mitigate the worst conse-
quences of the electoral process. 
END PARTISAN ELECTIONS AND
LENGTHEN TERMS OF OFFICE
Partisan elections are the least desirable
form of judicial selection because they present
the greatest threat to judicial independence.
In partisan races, candidates must run under
party labels, which encourages voters to
regard them as partisan advocates. This
method also spurs party committees to inter-
vene in the campaigns on behalf of their can-
didates, which increases the amount of nega-
tive campaigning and the level of combative-
ness in these races. Partisan elections, there-
fore, tend to be the most expensive contests,
which compels candidates to place more
emphasis on the burdensome task of raising
money. They thus lead citizens to conclude
that money bears an influence on the actions
of judges. 
A first step towards improving the current
electoral process is to eliminate partisan con-
tests. We strongly urge those states that use
this method to select judges at any level to
revise their system to include only nonpartisan
elections. No judicial candidate should ever
be asked to declare his or her partisan prefer-
ence in seeking judicial office.
Longer terms of office constitute another
structural change that would ameliorate 
political pressures on the judiciary. States t
hat require judges to run for office should
ensure that there are long intervals between
elections. This will help reduce the adverse
effects of electoral contests on judicial behav-
ior. Short terms of office require justices to
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present themselves before the electorate more
often, thus increasing the possibility that
judges will make decisions with political calcu-
lations in mind. At the very least, they raise
the perception of such influence, particularly
when a judge has to render an opinion on a
politically salient or controversial matter close
to an election year. As we have observed, the
vast majority of elected judges must now seek
office at least as often as U.S. Senate candi-
dates, and many of them must run even more
frequently. Such regular appearances before
the electorate encourage voters to regard
judges as pragmatic politicians, not neutral
arbiters of the law.
Longer terms of office will serve to reduce
political pressures by making the need to
raise money and actively campaign less fre-
quent. They also lower the chance that an
election will be dominated by one recent “hot
button” decision. And they may reduce the
perception that judges are making decisions
based on political calculations geared toward
an approaching election. Longer terms there-
fore promote a better balance between the
principles of judicial independence and
accountability. 
While the appropriate length of a term will
vary depending on the type of court and the
judicial structure within each state, we suggest
as a general rule that the length of term for
trial and appellate court judges should be a
minimum of six years and the term for justices
on the highest court a minimum of ten years. 
ELECTIONS SHOULD 
BE PUBLICLY FUNDED
Campaign contributions to political candi-
dates raise the inherent risk of elected officials
providing quid pro quo benefits in exchange for
political donations or in response to large
expenditures made on their behalf. Political
fundraising activities are thus a major cause of
unease at every level of government.
Preventing such corruption or even the
appearance of corruption has been deemed
by the Supreme Court to be the compelling
state interest in the financing of elections and
the principal justification for the regulation 
of campaign funding.73 The legitimacy of our
government is a function of our ability to 
protect it against the undue influence of 
campaign monies.
State campaign finance laws attempt to
address this imperative in part by placing lim-
its on the size and sources of political contri-
butions. While these measures reduce the
potential for corruption, they do not wholly
eliminate it. This is especially true in the case
of judicial elections. The mere act of soliciting
campaign gifts, even when done in accor-
dance with legal limitations, is not in keeping
with the role of a judge and can undermine
public perceptions of the impartiality of the
judiciary. The problem becomes particularly
troublesome when judges are required to raise
large sums of money from those who have an
interest or stake in court rulings, or from
those who may appear before the court in
some future matter. And, as detailed earlier in
this report, these sources are responsible for
most of the money in judicial campaigns.
Some states have taken further precautions
and attempted to insulate the judiciary from
the influence of campaign contributors by
imposing restrictions on fundraising activity to
avoid appearances of impropriety. For exam-
ple, 27 states prohibit sitting judges from per-
sonally soliciting campaign contributions.
Thirteen of these states place the same prohi-
bition on those seeking a judicial position. In
these states, candidates are required to form a
campaign committee to raise funds on their
behalf. But even where these restrictions
apply, judicial candidates report spending at
least some time raising money.74 Furthermore,
there is no evidence that the public perceives
a major distinction between funds raised by a
candidate personally and funds raised by a
candidate’s campaign committee. Indeed, 
the common understanding of how political
campaigns work would lead to the conclusion
that the two are one and the same. Prohibi-
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tions on personal solicitation of campaign gifts
by judges are thus a relatively ineffective
means of addressing the problems created 
by campaign fundraising. 
Contribution limits and restrictions on 
candidate fundraising do not go far enough 
in addressing the issues raised by the role of
money in judicial campaigns. We believe that
the best available means of protecting the judi-
cial process from the corruptive effects of
political donations is to finance campaigns
with public monies. Simply stated, the more
money candidates receive from public sources,
the less they will have to raise from individuals
and interest groups who may have an interest
in influencing particular government deci-
sions. Public funding thus reduces the risk 
of donor influence. 
Furthermore, public funding offers a num-
ber of other prospective benefits. It can
increase the pool of candidates willing to seek
judgeships by opening the selection process to
those who might otherwise be deterred by the
need to raise large sums of money. It can
lower campaign costs by eliminating the need
to pay for fundraising efforts. More important-
ly, it can reduce campaign spending by mak-
ing expenditure ceilings possible. To date, the
Supreme Court has held that campaign spend-
ing limits are constitutional only when they
are established as a condition of a candidate’s
decision to accept public subsidies.75 Public
funding is the key to controlling rising cam-
paign expenditures.
The effect of campaign contributions on
the behavior of elected officials and the con-
tent of public policies is a matter of grave
concern in any branch of government, but it
is a particularly acute problem with respect to
the judiciary. Throughout this report, we have
highlighted the distinct nature of judicial
office. The judicial branch of government is
based on principles that distinguish it from
the other branches of government. Judges are
not representatives. They are expected to be
independent and impartial arbiters of law,
responsible only to the law. Their behavior
must be appropriate to the purposes of 
their office. 
We believe that the case for public financ-
ing is compelling when it comes to judicial
elections. In our view, no judge should have
to rely on private donations to finance a bid
for office. The very act of raising money for
one’s own campaign is antithetical to the
principles of judicial independence and
impartiality. We therefore strongly endorse
the idea of  publicly funded judicial elec-
tions.
We would prefer a system of mandatory,
full public financing for all judicial candi-
dates. This approach, which would require all
candidates to rely only on public resources to
fund their campaigns, is the optimal solution
to the problems we have identified. However,
we recognize that the Supreme Court, in the
context of presidential elections, and a num-
ber of lower courts, in the context of state
gubernatorial or legislative contests, have
held that public funding systems must be vol-
untary. Whether the Court would rule differ-
ently in the case of judicial candidates, given
the distinct nature of judicial office, is yet to
be determined. We believe that the character
of the judiciary is so substantially distinct
from that of other elective offices that it
would be reasonable to reconsider current
doctrine in the judicial context. We acknowl-
edge, however, that until the Court rules oth-
erwise, candidates cannot be mandated to use
public funds. That is, candidates must be
allowed to decide whether they want to rely
on public funding or continue to run for
office using private funding raised from cam-
paign contributors.
Accordingly, we urge states to establish vol-
untary programs of full public financing for
judicial elections. These programs should be
modeled on the full public funding systems
now being used in Maine and Arizona for leg-
islative and gubernatorial candidates. In this
approach, qualified candidates who accept
public resources would receive a full subsidy
equal to the amount of the spending limit
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applicable to candidates seeking a particular
office (which in the case of the judiciary would
be the relevant level of court). Candidates who
accept this subsidy would also have to agree to
forego additional private fundraising and
abide by campaign spending limits.
To qualify for public funding, candidates
would have to meet some pre-established eli-
gibility criteria. The standard for eligibility
should ensure an open and equitable system,
without promoting frivolous or unqualified
candidates. For candidates in merit selection
states who are running in a retention elec-
tion, eligibility for public funding could be
based on a positive evaluation of the candi-
date as determined by a state’s retention eval-
uation commission (which is discussed at fur-
ther length below). Candidates who receive a
recommendation for retention would auto-
matically be eligible for public funding. 
In states that select candidates through
elections in the first instance, eligibility would
have to be determined by some other means.
The public funding systems now operating in
some states and localities usually require a
candidate to demonstrate a certain level of
public support, either by raising a fixed num-
ber of small contributions from individual
donors or by gathering a number of petition
signatures from qualified voters. In our view,
the petition requirement is to be preferred,
since it obviates the need for any fundraising
on the part of judicial candidates. But a peti-
tion requirement alone may not be an ade-
quate safeguard against frivolous candidates.
We would recommend that states also estab-
lish some objective criteria to establish that a
candidate is qualified for judicial office. For
example, states should require that a judicial
candidate, especially in the case of trial and
appellate courts, as well as a state’s highest
court, have a law degree, be admitted to prac-
tice before the court on which the candidate
is seeking a judgeship, and be certified as a
candidate in good standing by the appropri-
ate bar organization. Candidates who fulfill
these basic eligibility criteria and acquire a
requisite number of petition signatures would
be eligible for public funding.
The amount of the subsidy would be estab-
lished by a predetermined formula. It is essen-
tial that the amount be sufficient to ensure
that participating candidates have the
resources needed to wage a meaningful cam-
paign. The experience with public funding
programs now used in some states has demon-
strated that the adequacy of the resources pro-
vided to candidates is a key determinant of
their willingness to participate in the program.
If candidates perceive the amount of the sub-
sidy to be inadequate, they will be less willing
to accept public funding. We recommend a
limit no lower than the average amount spent
by candidates seeking a specific judicial seat in
the prior two election cycles. 
One drawback to a voluntary program,
which informs our preference for a compre-
hensive public funding approach, is that it
may place participating candidates at a com-
petitive disadvantage. A publicly-funded candi-
date who is opposed by a privately-financed
challenger or by a challenger spending unlim-
ited amounts of his or her own personal funds
may face the prospect of being outspent by
substantial margins, since a privately-funded
challenger or self-financed challenger would
not be subject to spending limits. Candidates
anticipating a serious challenge from a 
privately-funded opponent might thus be 
discouraged from accepting the public fund-
ing option. In order to minimize this incentive
not to participate, a public funding program
should provide supplemental resources for
candidates facing non-publicly funded oppo-
nents. This additional subsidy would be based
on a non-publicly funded challenger’s level of
spending. Once that challenger has exceeded
the spending limit established by the public
funding program, the publicly-funded candi-
date would receive supplemental funds on a
dollar-for-dollar matching basis up to a total
of twice the amount of the spending limit.
This supplemental funding provision should
also be applied to independent expenditures
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made by interest groups against a publicly-
funded candidate. 
These matching provisions will help ensure
that public financing does not create a drasti-
cally uneven playing field among the candi-
dates, and thus help to encourage broad par-
ticipation in the program. But this provision
does not entirely solve the strategic problem a
publicly-funded candidate might face.
Organized groups can still outspend a judicial
candidate by substantial amounts, since they
are not subject to spending limits. Similarly,
privately-funded candidates or candidates
spending their own personal funds will be
able to spend unlimited amounts. Thus, in
some instances, the availability of public fund-
ing might serve to increase the total amount
spent in a given election, since it may stimu-
late non-publicly-funded challengers or
groups to spend even more money in an
attempt to outpace a publicly-funded oppo-
nent. Consequently, voluntary public funding
offers only a partial solution to the problems
of campaign spending. 
We are aware that the costs of a public
funding program will place a greater burden
on the budgets of state and local governments,
which are already hard pressed to meet grow-
ing public demands. However, we believe that
the maintenance of an independent and
untarnished judiciary constitutes a public good
that merits the expenditure of public
resources. We realize that the experience with
public funding programs has demonstrated
that financing can be a major issue that can
undermine the effectiveness of this approach.
Some state legislatures, including most recently
the Massachusetts legislature, have been unwill-
ing to approve the resources needed to sustain
public financing programs. In those instances
where a state cannot accommodate the costs of
a broad-scale public funding program for all
judicial candidates, we would recommend that
they at least provide the funding needed to
finance the primary and general election 
campaigns of those seeking positions on the
highest courts and appellate courts. The 
problem of guaranteeing adequate financing 
is another obstacle that must be overcome if
public funding is to be effective.
IMPROVING DISCLOSURE OF
ISSUE ADVOCACY CAMPAIGNS
Full, effective, timely public disclosure is a
necessary component of any system of political
funding and a cornerstone of campaign
finance law. It is an essential safeguard against
corruption or the appearance of corruption,
since it ensures the transparency needed to
subject candidate finances to public scrutiny,
as well as to ensure proper enforcement of the
law. Disclosure also allows voters to make
more informed decisions by providing a
means of judging a candidate based on his or
her sources of financial support. 
Given the inadequate state of the current
disclosure regulations applied to judicial can-
didates, there is a pressing need for further
regulation in this area. Many states do not
make comprehensive reports of the receipts
and expenditures of candidates readily avail-
able to the public or prepare summary reports
of judicial campaign financing for public dis-
tribution. Few post information on web sites
or provide electronic access to judicial cam-
paign data. States need to review their disclo-
sure statutes to ensure timely and readily avail-
able public access to such information. 
We further believe that members of the
legal profession have a responsibility to dis-
close the financial assistance that they provide
to judicial candidates. Attorneys and law firms
should be required to disclose any direct or
indirect contributions they make to judicial
candidates. These disclosures should be
reported to the relevant state campaign or
elections administrative agency, which would
disseminate the information to the public 
in a suitable form. Placing the onus on 
members of the legal profession to assume
responsibility for reporting both direct and
indirect donations will ensure more effective
disclosure and better safeguard the judicial
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system against potential conflicts of interest. It
will also reduce the incentive to circumvent
disclosure by means of donating funds to third
party groups or independent political commit-
tees that support a candidate. 
One of the most prominent changes that
has taken place in the financing of judicial
elections is the rise of issue advocacy advertis-
ing by organized groups in connection with
specific judicial contests. Because these adver-
tisements and other types of communications
do not “expressly advocate” the election or
defeat of a specific candidate, as defined by
the courts, the monies spent on them do not
have to be disclosed under most state disclo-
sure statutes. In order to ensure greater trans-
parency of the monies spent in connection
with judicial campaigns, these statutes should
be revised to include a narrowly tailored provi-
sion to disclose the source of funding for any
ads that are clearly intended to influence the
outcome of a judicial election, whether or not
the ads specifically call for the election or
defeat of a named candidate.
The states should adopt standards to
ensure that the monies raised and spent on
issue advocacy advertising in connection with
judicial campaigns are fully disclosed to the
public. State disclosure laws should set forth
clear criteria for identifying public communi-
cations that would be required to be disclosed
under election finance regulations. These cri-
teria should include communications that: (1)
refer to a clearly identified candidate for judi-
cial office, or feature the image or likeness of
a clearly identified judicial candidate; (2) are
broadcast on television or radio, or distributed
to voters through direct mail, non-broadcast
advertisements, or voter pamphlets; (3)
achieve some threshold aggregate amount in
expenditures that would trigger disclosure
requirements; and (4) are broadcast or distrib-
uted in close proximity to an election. Any
campaign communications that meet these
criteria would have to be disclosed to the pub-
lic. The disclosure requirement should
include the sources of funding and the
amounts expended. 
We recognize that this proposal may not
withstand judicial scrutiny. But given the
nature of judicial elections and the potential
influence of such advertising campaigns on
the outcomes of judicial elections, we believe
that these regulations are justified and that
there is a compelling interest served by estab-
lishing them. In the event that the approach
we have outlined is not upheld by the courts,
we would support the most comprehensive
regime of disclosure permitted. 
ESTABLISH JUDICIAL RETENTION
EVALUATION PROGRAMS AND
PUBLISH VOTER GUIDES
Most retention elections are less combative
than other types of judicial elections, because
the candidate standing for retention faces no
opponent. When a judge does face opposition
in a retention election, the debate is usually
provoked by an organized group that is chal-
lenging the candidate on the basis of a single
issue or a decision rendered in a particular
case. Retention elections are therefore waged
on the basis of little or no information about 
a judge’s overall record or qualifications. In
most instances, voters lack useful information
about a judge’s performance in office, so they
cast uninformed or undifferentiated ballots or
fail to cast a vote at all in these contests. This
lack of information leaves candidates vulnera-
ble to well-funded, single-issue opposition
campaigns.76
We believe that states that employ merit
selection systems and hold retention elections
to determine the continuing service of judges
could improve the election process by estab-
lishing judicial retention evaluation programs
to assess judicial performance. These pro-
grams enhance the level of accountability in
the selection process by requiring a thorough
and objective assessment of a judge’s 
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qualifications and performance in office.
They also increase the amount of information
available to voters, thereby reducing the possi-
bility of poorly informed voter decisions. 
Six of the 19 states that hold retention elec-
tions have created judicial retention evalua-
tion programs. In 1976, Alaska became the
first state to adopt such a program. In 1997,
New Mexico became the most recent. The
others are Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico,
and Tennessee.77 These programs were devel-
oped to respond to the need for voter infor-
mation in retention elections. 
The programs are based on a common
model. Each state has established a commis-
sion responsible for evaluating candidates for
retention. In most instances, commission
members are appointed by elective officials
and/or members of the judiciary, and are
funded by the legislature or the judicial
branch. For example, in Colorado, the Chief
Justice, the Governor, the Speaker of the
House, and the President of the Senate each
appoint a lawyer and non-lawyer member of
the commission. In Alaska, the board of gover-
nors of the Alaska Bar Association appoint the
lawyer members, the governor appoints non-
lawyer members with the approval of the legis-
lature, and the chief justice of the state
supreme court serves ex officio. 
A retention evaluation commission is
responsible for measuring each judge’s perfor-
mance, based on a variety of objective criteria
or performance standards that are established
by law and are openly accessible to judges,
evaluators, and the public. The commission
may meet with the judge and collect data such
as caseload statistics, disposition records, disci-
plinary sanctions, and other non-survey infor-
mation. In addition, surveys of court users are
conducted to solicit opinions of the judge.
This information becomes the basis for a sum-
mary of findings that includes a recommenda-
tion for retention or notes a failure to meet
performance standards. 
Evaluations by independent commissions
offer a valuable means of holding judges
accountable for their behavior in office. This
approach is far less politicized or subjective
than other alternatives such as a decision
made solely by an appointing authority or an
assessment based on information gathered in
a typical election campaign. It is also more
beneficial for judges, since it provides clear
criteria and standards that offer guidelines for
the execution of their duties. Indeed, a very
high percentage of judges in states with these
programs claim that the reports issued by the
commissions provide useful feedback on their
performance. Moreover, nearly all judges con-
sider it to be a fair process, and a majority feel
that it holds them appropriately accountable
for their job performance.78
Further, these evaluation programs have
proved to be a valuable means of improving
voter knowledge of judicial candidates.
Surveys of voters familiar with these evaluation
reports in selected cities found that more than
60 percent of voters felt that the official infor-
mation distributed to the public from these
reports influenced their voting choices, and
about 67 percent said that the availability of
the information made them “more likely to
vote in a judicial election.”79
We therefore conclude that every state that
holds retention elections should establish eval-
uation commissions and offer voters a recom-
mendation on whether a judge should be
retained. States should disseminate the con-
tents of these evaluations widely by distribut-
ing voter guides and other materials that
include this information. In this way, voters
will have access to independent, objective
information about the candidates. 
Voters in retention elections are not the
only citizens who would benefit from addition-
al information about judicial candidates. All
states that hold elections should publish voter
guides that include information about judicial
candidates. We recommend that the office of
the Secretary of State in each state compile
background biographical information on judi-
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cial candidates and candidate statements for
inclusion in a voter guide that would be pub-
lished at public expense and made widely
available to the public. 
CONCLUSION
While the reforms we have suggested will
alleviate some of the problems associated with
elections, they will not address our most fun-
damental concerns. Candidates will still have
to compete in election campaigns in order 
to hold office and thus will continue to face
political pressures. The availability of public
funding will ease the financial pressures many
candidates face, but will not put an end to 
privately-funded campaigns or to rising cam-
paign expenditures, especially in those con-
tests where one or more candidates eschew
public funds. Interest groups will continue to
mount extensive efforts to support or defeat
particular candidates. The most competitive
elections will still devolve into single-issue con-
tests that polarize the electorate. In short, elec-
toral reforms can only go so far in improving
judicial selection. To fully address the prob-
lems in most state judicial selection systems, a
more comprehensive change is needed: the
establishment of selection by appointment in
every state.
32
JUSTICE FOR HIRE
CED strongly believes that appointment
should be the basic principle that governs the
selection of all judges. 
Appointment is the best method of ensur-
ing judicial independence. It is the only selec-
tion process that avoids the problems associat-
ed with elections, since it is the only method
that does not require judicial candidates or 
sitting judges to participate in some form of
popular election to gain or retain office.
Appointed judges do not need to solicit cam-
paign contributions. They do not face the
electoral incentive to tailor their opinions to
the preferences of popular majorities. Nor 
do they need to be responsive to the pressure
tactics of organized interests.
We further support appointment because it
is the most inclusive and fair process of selec-
tion. In elective systems, including merit-based
systems that require retention elections, the
pool of judicial candidates is necessarily limit-
ed to those who are willing to run in an elec-
tion. An appointive system promotes a wider
pool of candidates, since any qualified individ-
ual who expresses a willingness to serve may
be considered. Moreover, the assessment of an
applicant’s qualifications and capacities is con-
ducted through a deliberative process less sub-
ject to partisan or political influences than
that which occurs in the context of a political
campaign. Appointment thus facilitates a
more dispassionate and thorough review of
the qualifications and abilities of judicial aspi-
rants. Overall, it best guarantees a capable and
effective judiciary.
Generally, we support an appointive system
that is based on a three-stage process. In the
first stage, a group of eligible judicial candi-
dates would be determined. An independent
judicial nominating commission would recruit
and review candidates for office and develop a
list of potential nominees. In the second stage,
vacancies would be filled by appointment. In
every instance, an appointment would be
made by the appropriate authority as deter-
mined by state law, which usually would be the
governor, whose choice must be made from
the list of candidates submitted by the judicial
nominating commission. Each appointee
would serve for a limited term of office. At 
the end of each term, the third stage of the
process would commence. An independent
judicial performance evaluation commission
would conduct a comprehensive, objective
review of a judge’s performance in office and
prepare an evaluation report and a recom-
mendation as to reappointment. The gover-
nor or other appointing authority would then
be responsible for making the decision to
reappoint the judge or make a new appoint-
ment.
In supporting selection by appointment,
we recognize that this method will not always
function ideally. The appointment system can
also be affected by political and partisan con-
cerns, as the recent experience in the selec-
tion of federal judges demonstrates. However,
this method is still to be preferred over elec-
tive systems, where inappropriate political
influences lurk in almost every case, and pub-
lic perceptions of impropriety are becoming
increasingly pervasive. Furthermore, we
believe that appropriate safeguards are avail-
able to minimize undue influence in the
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appointments process. This is an important
reason why we support the use of nominating
commissions to assess the qualifications of
judicial candidates, in addition to other inde-
pendent bodies to perform periodic reviews
and evaluations of sitting judges.
ESTABLISH JUDICIAL
NOMINATING COMMISSIONS
Appointive systems present a risk to judicial
independence primarily when appointment is
left to the discretion of a single authority, as in
the case of vacancy appointments in most
states, where the interim position is usually
filled by an appointee selected by the state’s
governor. In these instances, chief executives
with sole authority to appoint a judge, or with
authority to nominate and appoint a judge
subject only to legislative approval, are free to
determine the criteria they will use to make a
selection. They typically select a political sup-
porter, or only consider potential nominees
from their political party in hopes of placing
an “ally” on the bench. Frequently, they rely
on recommendations from local party officials
in making these appointments, thereby associ-
ating judgeships with a form of political
patronage.80
Many states have addressed this problem by
establishing nonpartisan, independent judicial
nominating commissions as part of their
appointment process. At present, 24 states and
the District of Columbia use a commission-
based appointment plan for the initial selec-
tion of some or all levels of the judiciary, and
an additional ten states use a similar plan, but
only to fill midterm vacancies.81 While the pro-
visions of state law vary, these commissions
generally are permanent, nonpartisan boards
comprised of lawyers, non-lawyers, and in
some states, ex-officio judges. Most states set
terms of four or six years for commission
membership. To ensure the independence
and nonpartisanship of these bodies, many
states divide the responsibility for selecting
members among a number of authorities,
including the governor, the legislature, 
members of the state’s highest court, and 
bar association officers.
These judicial nominating commissions 
are responsible for recruiting, assessing, and
screening potential candidates for judicial
vacancies. When a judicial vacancy arises, the
commission submits a list of prospective nomi-
nees, usually consisting of three to five candi-
dates, to the appropriate appointing authority,
which is typically the governor of the state.
The governor is then generally bound by law
to make a final selection from the nominees
included on the list.82
These commissions have received positive
assessments from those involved in the
appointment process. In a survey conducted
by the American Judicature Society in 1991,
governors in states with merit selection plans
that include nominating commissions
expressed favorable views of the system, noting
that this approach focuses selection on the
merits of the candidates themselves. At that
time, these governors agreed that commission-
based appointments minimize partisan politi-
cal considerations, provide high quality nomi-
nees, and broaden the pool of applicants.83
This view of the quality of commission-
based nominees is shared by the chairs of
these commissions. According to a survey 
conducted by the American Bar Foundation,
89 percent of the commissioners report being
satisfied either “always” or “in the majority 
of cases” with the quality of the candidates
they were able to pass along to appointing
authorities.84
We consider a judicial nominating commis-
sion to be an essential component of any
appointment-based selection process. We
therefore recommend that all judges in state
court systems be selected through a commis-
sion-based appointment process. An indepen-
dent, nonpartisan, broadly based nominating
commission provides a necessary element of
pre-selection review that serves to insulate 
the appointment process from political influ-
ence. Moreover, it promotes the independent
selection of capable and qualified judicial can-
didates, which is a necessary component of an
impartial and effective judicial system.
In making this recommendation, we join
with those, particularly the American Bar
Association and the American Judicature
Society, who have long supported this notion.†
These organizations have developed detailed
guidelines and models for the establishment
of judicial nominating commissions.85 We urge
state officials to review these standards in
establishing nominating commissions for their
states. 
With respect to this recommendation, we
would further note a number of basic features
essential to a properly functioning nominating
process. First and foremost, the commission
must be able to act independently. It must be
free to recruit, review, and recommend candi-
dates without being subject to partisan or
political pressures. We therefore support com-
missions consisting of a mixture of lawyers,
non-lawyers, and ex-officio judges who serve
fixed terms of office. The responsibility for
selecting members should be divided among
diverse appointing authorities, including the
governor, the legislature, members of the
state’s highest court, and bar association 
officers. 
Nominating commissions also must oper-
ate through open and regular procedures that
encourage applications from and considera-
tion of the widest possible pool of candidates.
Commissions should be charged with the
responsibility of actively recruiting highly-
qualified candidates in order to strengthen
their available choices. In screening these can-
didates, they should rely on a broad range of
criteria in order to ensure a thorough and fair
assessment of the relative merits of judicial
aspirants. 
It is also necessary for state judicial selec-
tion systems to specify that the governor (or
other appointing authority under state
statute) is required to draw judicial nominees
from the list of candidates provided by nomi-
nating commissions. Absent such a provision,
nominating commissions may become merely
advisory bodies, which would diminish their
value. 
Finally, in order to ensure a timely and effi-
cient selection process, nominating commis-
sions should be required to submit candidates
in a timely manner when a position becomes
open. The vast majority of states that now use
nominating commissions impose time limits,
in most cases from 30 to 60 days, that encour-
age the body to act quickly in recommending
individuals to fill a vacancy.86 This restriction
helps to avoid situations where a vacancy is left
unfilled for a lengthy period of time. 
Require Periodic Review 
and Evaluation
An appointment-based selection process
must include a periodic review of the perfor-
mance of judges at regular intervals.
Accordingly, judges should be appointed for
terms of fixed length, with eligibility to be
reappointed. The length of the terms estab-
lished should be appropriate to the level of
the court. With respect to the highest courts,
we suggest a minimum term of ten years. The
terms of members of the highest courts also
should be staggered to ensure reasonable con-
tinuity. 
Most states that use some form of appoint-
ment, whether it be entirely or in the first
instance, limit the length of terms of office,
even on the court of last resort. Only three
states do not follow this practice.‡ Terms of
fixed length provide appointing authorities
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† The American Judicature Society has supported the use of
judicial nominating commissions since 1913 and the
Americaan Bar Association has endorsed the use of judicial
nominating commissions in merit selection systems since
1937.
‡ In Rhode Island, justices on the high court serve life terms.
In Massachusetts and New Hampshire, justices are allowed to
serve until age 70.
with a pre-determined opportunity to assess
the performance of judges and decide
whether they should continue to hold their
positions. 
At the time of a judge’s reappointment,
state authorities should be required to carry
out a careful and thorough review of that
judge’s performance. The findings of this
review should be given due consideration 
in making a reappointment decision. To 
facilitate this process, we recommend that 
each state establish a judicial performance
evaluation committee to review the perfor-
mance of judges and make a public recom-
mendation as to whether a judge should be
reappointed. These performance evaluation
commissions should be modeled on the judi-
cial retention evaluation programs described
in our previous discussion of election
reforms.
In the case of retention elections, the per-
formance reports of judicial evaluation com-
missions are made available to voters for their
use in making voting decisions. But the model
could easily be adapted to an appointment sys-
tem. In this regard the findings would be used
as a basis for a recommendation for or against
reappointment. The commission would con-
duct a comprehensive review of a judge’s per-
formance in office and submit a report to a
governor (or other appointing authority, as
dictated by state law). This evaluation would
provide a source of independent and objective
information that would enhance deliberations
on reappointment decisions. To preserve
gubernatorial discretion, the commission’s
recommendation on reappointment should
not be binding, although we expect that the
commission’s guidance would be followed in
most cases. The same process of evaluation by
a judicial performance commission would take
place at the completion of each subsequent
term for each judge.
Judicial performance evaluation commis-
sions ensure accountability in the selection
process. This type of assessment holds judges
responsible for their overall performance,
including their management of caseloads,
behavior towards all those who appear before
them, and rates of reversal on appeal. They
also encourage civic involvement in the
process, not only by including citizens as com-
mission members, but also by soliciting public
comment on judges’ performance. For exam-
ple, in Alaska, Arizona, and Colorado, the
evaluation commission review includes surveys
of attorneys and others who participate in
court proceedings, information gathered at
public hearings, or written public comments
(see Table 2). Moreover, it provides judges
with the information needed to help them
improve their performance and address areas
of concern. Indeed, judges have found such
reviews to be as useful as voters do, especially
in those states that conduct confidential
midterm evaluations that are intended for a
judge’s self-improvement.87 We believe that
such midterm evaluations add significant
value in making judges accountable for their
actions. We therefore strongly recommend
that they be included in any program of per-
formance evaluation.
Ensure Adequate Compensation
The efficacy of a commission-based
appointment system depends on having a
broad pool of qualified individuals who are
willing to serve as judges. Although the vast
majority of those who seek judgeships act out
of a desire to serve their communities and
their profession, the level of compensation
can be a disincentive for highly-qualified indi-
viduals to act on their desires. Most of those
who serve as nominating commission chairs
report that a low level of compensation, as
perceived by potential judicial nominees, is an
important factor in discouraging individuals
from agreeing to be considered for vacant
judgeships. The only other major deterrent is
the desire of potential candidates to continue
to practice law.88 This decision may also reflect
the relatively low compensation presently
offered to state court judges.
The compensation provided to state court
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Table 2
Model Judicial Evaluation Procedures
Alaska Arizona Colorado Utah
Groups Alaska Bar Lawyers, litigants, Jurors, litigants, Attorneys; jury
surveyed members; peace witnesses, jurors, court personnel, surveys began
and probation other judges/justices, probation officers, in 1997
officers who handle staff social service and
criminal cases; court law enforcement
staff; jurors for last personnel, crime
2 years of term victims, attorneys
Nonsurvey Judge’s self-evaluation; Judge’s previous self- Caseload evaluation; Compliance with
sources of legal, discipline, or evaluations and interview with the judge cases-under-
information health records; attorneys professional goals advisement standard;
in 9-12 major cases physical and mental
handled by judge; competence; 
judicial conduct completion of 30 
commission; conflict hours continuing 
of interest filings; other education per year; 
case information in substantial compli-
ance with Code of 
Judicial Conduct and
Code of Judicial 
Administration
Public input Hearings, newspaper ads Public hearings; requests Public hearings No
and PSAs encourage for public comment authorized in 1997;
public comment in writing public comments in 
writing
Judge Council “may” interview; Factual report must be Yes, after receiving Judge may request
interview draft results shared with sent to judge; judge can analysis of questionnaire interview if he or
mandatory? judge prior to final submit written response; results she fails to meet
evaluation meeting conference team certification
interviews standards
SOURCE: Kevin M. Esterling, “Judicial Accountability the Right Way,” Judicature, vol. 82, no. 5 (1999), p. 209.
judges should not be so low that it discourages
well-qualified individuals from seeking judge-
ships. According to a 2001 survey by the
National Center for State Courts, annual
salaries of associate justices of the highest state
courts range from about $89,400 to $162,400,
with a median of $116,500. Salaries of judges
of general jurisdiction trial courts range from
about $81,600 to $137,200, with a median of
$113,000.89 These ranges fall well below the
salaries earned by attorneys at many law firms.
Accordingly, as a corollary to our call for 
commission-based appointment systems, we
urge state officials to ensure that appropriate
levels of compensation are provided to judges
at all levels. This will enhance the efficacy of
the judicial selection process by encouraging a
larger number of highly qualified individuals
to enter the nominating process. 
MERIT SELECTION AS 
AN ALTERNATIVE
We acknowledge that most states will find it
politically impracticable to move to a commis-
sion-based appointment system any time soon.
A fully appointed judiciary requires a funda-
mental transformation of the judiciaries in
most states. In many of these states, this
change demands a shift away from a widely
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accepted practice deeply embedded in the
state’s political culture. For those states that
do not adopt an appointive system, we prefer
the use of merit selection as an alternative to
selection by popular vote.
We regard appointment as the grounding
principle of judicial selection. We prefer merit
selection systems because they have the virtue
of appointing judges in the first instance. And
the retention elections that are employed in
these systems pose less of a threat to judicial
independence than other types of judicial
elections. Retention elections do not require a
candidate to face an opponent, so they tend
to be less contentious and less expensive. They
are usually low visibility elections. They rarely
lead to the removal of an appointed judge.
However, merit selection systems still have
the drawback that they do not eliminate the
problems associated with elections. Contested
retention contests can become just as combat-
ive, expensive, and politicized as competitive
races between opposing candidates. They can
be a focal point of interest group electioneer-
ing. And they usually devolve into a debate
over a single policy issue or, in the worst cases,
a single judicial decision.
States that now rely on merit selection sys-
tems to choose judges, as well as those states
that move to this method in the future, should
ensure that their systems incorporate safe-
guards to enhance the continuing indepen-
dence and quality of their judiciaries.
Specifically, we urge states to follow the model
that we have outlined in our call for an
appointive system. States that do not currently
use nominating commissions to identify
potential judicial nominees should establish a
commission and require that the appointing
authority select a candidate from its list of
nominees. Commission-based nominations
should be used to fill interim vacancies, as well
as appointments in the first instance. Further,
we recommend that states establish judicial
retention evaluation programs to assess candi-
dates running in retention elections. As noted
previously in our discussion, we feel that this
approach will give voters access to indepen-
dent, objective information about the candi-
dates, which will promote more informed vot-
ing decisions. 
CONCLUSION
Court decisions affect many aspects of
American life. They determine the scope of
citizens’ liberties, the substantive legal rules
governing everyday transactions, the nature of
the products available in the marketplace, and
the caliber of our system of justice. State
courts, in particular, are responsible for inter-
preting and enforcing common law doctrines
that, unless modified by statute, determine the
legal responsibilities for the harms associated
with a wide variety of products, actions, and
social risks that citizens may encounter in
their daily lives. In essence, they define what
constitutes appropriate legal protection in our
society. 
Given the vital role of courts, citizens must
have confidence in the integrity and impartial-
ity of the judicial process. The courts must be
accepted as a credible forum for resolving
legal disputes. Those who appear before them
must have faith that they will receive a fair
hearing before a judge whose discretion and
judgment will not be skewed by influences
outside of the law. Such confidence is essential
to the effective rule of law. 
The current patchwork of diverse methods
of judicial selection does not fulfill the need
for an impartial and independent system of
justice. The threat to our judicial system that
stems from the manner in which judges are
selected in 39 of the states is real and growing.
As more races become partisan battles
between conflicting economic interests or
political parties, respect for the system will
continue to erode.
There is a comparable threat to federal-
ism. Recall the chilling words of the judge
who warned that it is all too easy for a court
and a jury to punish an out-of-state defen-
dant economically to benefit local residents.
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One study of 75,000 tort decisions from
across the states has found that jury awards
against out-of-state defendants are substan-
tially larger than awards against in-state
defendants.90 Such outcomes are to be
expected when judges are subject to 
political and electoral pressures.
We cannot be optimistic about our ability
to remedy the problem. The task of seeking
substantial reform in most states is daunting.
Success will require even greater public 
support than that which secured campaign
finance reform at the federal level after 
many years of effort. 
An alternative that might resolve some 
of the problems we have raised would be to
expand the diversity jurisdiction of our federal
courts. There is some precedent for this 
alternative, which would require an Act of
Congress. Congress might enact a minimum
standard for state judicial selection that could,
for example, restrict judicial selection to reten-
tion elections that are publicly funded. In any
state that did not meet that minimum stan-
dard, an out-of-state defendant would have a
greatly expanded right to remove the case to
federal court on diversity grounds. 
Whether this approach or some other
proves feasible is beyond the scope of this
paper. But it merits consideration in future
discussions of the problems associated with
judicial elections. 
CED believes that there is a compelling
need for a broad public dialogue on the prob-
lems of judicial selection. We offer this report
in an effort to promote such a dialogue and
thereby stimulate a thoughtful and wide-rang-
ing debate about the best means of ensuring a
qualified, independent, and accountable judi-
ciary. We have offered recommendations that
set forth a direction for reform that we feel
best conforms to the principled role our
nation expects of its judicial system. We hope
that our efforts will encourage additional sug-
gestions for guaranteeing the impartial admin-
istration of justice for all Americans. 
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Appendix:
Judicial Selection in the States 
APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS
2002
APPOINTIVE ELECTIVE
SYSTEMS SYSTEMS
Merit
Selection Appointment INITIAL
Through without Non-                            TERM OF
Nominating Nominating Partisan Partisan   OFFICE
STATE AND COURT Commission Commission Election Election      (YEARS)     METHOD OF RETENTION
ALABAMA
Supreme Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Court of Civil Appeals X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Court of Criminal Appeals X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Circuit Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
ALASKA
Supreme Court X 3 Retention election (10 year term)
Court of Appeals X 3 Retention election (8 year term)
Superior Court X 3 Retention election (6 year term)
ARIZONA
Supreme Court X 2 Retention election (6 year term)
Court of Appeals X 2 Retention election (6 year term)
Superior Court (County
population > 250,000) X 2 Retention election (4 yearterm)
Superior Court (County
population < 250,000) X 4 Re-election for additional terms
ARKANSAS
Supreme Court X 8 Re-election for additional terms 
Court of Appeals X 8 Re-election for additional terms 
Circuit Court X 4 Re-election for additional terms
CALIFORNIA
Supreme Court X(G)1 12 Retention election (12 year term)
Courts of Appeal X(G) 12 Retention election (12 year term)
Superior Court2 X 6 Nonpartisan election (6 year term)
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1. Gubernatorial (G) or Legislative (L)
2. The California constitution provides that local electors may choose gubernatorial appointments instead of nonpartisan election to select
superior court judges. As of July 1999, no counties have chosen gubernatorial appointments.
COLORADO
Supreme Court X 2 Retention election (10 year term)
Court of Appeals X 2 Retention election (8 year term)
District Court X 2 Retention election (6 year term)
CONNECTICUT
Supreme Court X 8 Commission reviews incumbent’s 
performance on noncompetitive 
basis; governor renominates
and legislature confirms.
Appellate Court X 8 Same
Superior Court X 8 Same
DELAWARE3
Supreme Court X 12 See footnote4
Court of Chancery X 12 See footnote4
Superior Court X 12 See footnote4
DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA
Court of Appeals X 15 Reappointment by judicial 
tenure commission5
Superior Court X 15 Reappointment by judicial 
tenure commission5
FLORIDA
Supreme Court X 1 Retention election (6 year term)
District Court of Appeal X 1 Retention election (6 year term)
Circuit Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
GEORGIA
Supreme Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Court of Appeals X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Superior Court X 4 Re-election for additional terms
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APPOINTIVE ELECTIVE
SYSTEMS SYSTEMS
Merit
Selection Appointment INITIAL
Through without Non-                            TERM OF
Nominating Nominating Partisan Partisan   OFFICE
STATE AND COURT Commission Commission Election Election      (YEARS)     METHOD OF RETENTION
3. Merit selection established by executive order in Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.  In all other jurisdictions merit
selection is established by constitutional or statutory provision.
4. Incumbent reapplies to nominating commission and competes with other applicants for nomination to the governor. The governor may
reappoint the incumbent or another nominee.  The Senate confirms the appointment.
5. Initial appointment is made by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.  Three months prior to the expiration of the
term of office, the judge’s performance is reviewed by the tenure commission. Those found “Exceptionally Well Qualified” or “Well
Qualified” are automatically reappointed.  If a judge is found to be “Qualified” the President may nominate the judge for an additional term
(subject to Senate confirmation). If the President does not wish to reappoint the judge, the District of Columbia Nomination Commission
compiles a new list of candidates.
HAWAII
Supreme Court X 10 Reappointment to subsequent 
term by Judicial Selection 
Commission (10 year term)
Intermediate Court
of Appeals X 10 Same
Circuit Court and 
Family Court X 10 Same
IDAHO
Supreme Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Courts of Appeals X 6 Re-election for additional terms
District Courts X 4 Re-election for additional terms
ILLINOIS
Supreme Court X 10 Retention election (10 year term)
Appellate Court X 10 Retention election (10 year term)
Circuit Court X 6 Retention election (6 year term)
INDIANA
Supreme Court X 2 Retention election (10 year term)
Court of Appeals X 2 Retention election (10 year term)
Circuit Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Circuit Court 
(Vanderburgh County) X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Superior Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms 
Superior Court
(Allen County)  X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Superior Court
(Lake County) X6 2 Retention election (6 year term)
Superior Court
(St. Joseph County) X 2 Retention election (6 year term) 
Superior Court
(Vanderburgh County) X 6 Re-election for additional terms
IOWA
Supreme Court X 1 Retention election (8 year term)
Court of Appeals X 1 Retention election (6 year term)
District Court X 1 Retention election (6 year term)
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6. Three of the judges run in partisan elections for 6 year terms then have to be re-elected for additional terms.
KANSAS
Supreme Court X 1 Retention election (6 year term)
Court of Appeals X 1 Retention election (4 year term)
District Court
(17 districts) X 1 Retention election (4 year term)
District Court
(14 districts) X 4 Re-election for additional terms
KENTUCKY
Supreme Court X 8 Re-election for additional terms
Court of Appeals X 8 Re-election for additional terms
Circuit Court X 8 Re-election for additional terms
LOUISIANA
Supreme Court X7 10 Re-election for additional terms 
Court of Appeals X7 10 Re-election for additional terms
District Court X7 6 Re-election for additional terms
MAINE
Supreme Judicial Court X(G) 7 Reappointment by governor, 
subject to legislative confirmation
Superior Court X(G) 7 Same
MARYLAND8
Court of Appeals X see fn9 Retention election (10 year term)
Court of Special Appeals X see fn9 Retention election (10 year term)
Circuit Court X see fn9 Nonpartisan election (15 year 
term)10
MASSACHUSETTS11
Supreme Judicial Court X to age 70
Appeals Court X to age 70
Trial Court of Mass. X to age 70
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7. Louisiana judicial elections are partisan in as much as the candidates’ party affiliations appear on the ballot. However, two factors lend a 
somewhat nonpartisan character to these elections: (1) primaries are open to all candidates; and (2) judicial candidates generally do not
solicit party support for their campaigns.
8. See Delaware, footnote 3.
9. Until the first general election following the expiration of one year from the date of the occurrence of the vacancy.
10. May be challenged by other candidates.
11. See Delaware, footnote 3.
MICHIGAN12
Supreme Court X 8 Re-election for additional terms
Court of Appeals X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Circuit Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
MINNESOTA
Supreme Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Court of Appeals X 6 Re-election for additional terms
District Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
MISSISSIPPI
Supreme Court X 8 Re-election for additional terms
Court of Appeals X 8 Re-election for additional terms
Chancery Court X 4 Re-election for additional terms
Circuit Court X 4 Re-election for additional terms
MISSOURI
Supreme Court X 1 Retention election (12 year term)
Court of Appeals X 1 Retention election (12 year term)
Circuit Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Circuit Court (Jackson,
Clay, Platte, Saint 
Louis Counties) X 1 Retention election (6 year term)
MONTANA
Supreme Court X 8 Re-election; unopposed judges 
run for retention
District Court X 6 Re-election; unopposed judges
run for retention
NEBRASKA
Supreme Court X 3 Retention election (6 year term)
Court of Appeals X 3 Retention election (6 year term)
District Court X 3 Retention election (6 year term)
NEVADA
Supreme Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
District Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
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12. On the Michigan ballot, party affiliation does not appear beside the names of judicial candidates.  In this way, the system is technically 
nonpartisan. However, candidates are nominated from party conventions, and frequently run with party endorsements. This system for
nominating candidates in Michigan coupled with recent general election campaigns, reveals that, in substance if not in law, the character of
Michigan’s selection system is in fact highly partisan.
NEW HAMPSHIRE13
Supreme Court X14 to age 70
Superior Court X14 to age 70
NEW JERSEY
Supreme Court X(G) 7 Reappointment by governor (to
age 70) with advice and consent 
of the Senate
Appellate Division of 
Superior Court X(G) 7 Same
Superior Court X(G) 7 Same
NEW MEXICO
Supreme Court X Until next See footnote15
general
election
Court of Appeals X Until next See footnote15
general
election
District Court X Until next See footnote15
general
election
NEW YORK
Court of Appeals X 14 See footnote16
Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court X 5 Commission reviews and
recommends for or against
reappointment by the Governor
Supreme Court X 14 Re-election for additional terms
County Court X 10 Re-election for additional terms
NORTH CAROLINA
Supreme Court X 8 Re-election for additional terms
Court of Appeals X 8 Re-election for additional terms
Superior Court X 8 Re-election for additional terms
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13. See Delaware, footnote 3.
14. The Governor’s nomination is subject to the approval of a five-member executive council.
15. Partisan election at next general election after appointment for eight-year term for appellate judges, six-year term for district. The winner
thereafter runs in a retention election for subsequent terms.
16. Incumbent reapplies to nominating commission and competes with other applicants for nomination to the governor. The governor may
reappoint the incumbent or another nominee. The Senate confirms the appointment.
NORTH DAKOTA
Supreme Court X 10 Re-election for additional terms
District Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
OHIO17
Supreme Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Court of Appeals X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Court of Common Pleas X 6 Re-election for additional terms
OKLAHOMA
Supreme Court X 1 Retention election (6 year term)
Court of Criminal
Appeals X 1 Retention election (6 year term)
Court of Appeals X 1 Retention election (6 year term)
District Court X 4 Re-election for additional terms
OREGON
Supreme Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Court of Appeals X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Circuit Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Tax Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
PENNSYLVANIA
Supreme Court X 10 Retention election (10 year term)
Superior Court X 10 Retention election (10 year term)
Commonwealth Court X 10 Retention election (10 year term)
Court of Common Pleas X 10 Retention election (10 year term)
RHODE ISLAND
Supreme Court X Life
Superior Court X Life
Worker’s Compensation
Court X Life
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17. Ohio general elections do no list party affiliations on the ballot. Candidates, however, must run in partisan primary elections and frequently
run with party endorsements. Recent elections for the Ohio Supreme Court reveal a pattern of partisan elections in substance if not in law.
SOUTH CAROLINA18
Supreme Court X(L) 10 Reappointment by legislature
Court of Appeals X(L) 6 Reappointment by legislature
Circuit Court X(L) 6 Reappointment by legislature
SOUTH DAKOTA
Supreme Court X 3 Retention election (8 year term)
Circuit Court X 8 Re-election for additional terms
TENNESSEE
Supreme Court X See fn19 Retention election (8 year term)
Court of Appeals X See fn19 Retention election (8 year term)
Court of Criminal Appeals X See fn19 Retention election (8 year term)
Chancery Court X 8 Re-election for additional terms
Criminal Court X 8 Re-election for additional terms
Circuit Court X 8 Re-election for additional terms
TEXAS
Supreme Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Court of Criminal Appeals X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Court of Appeals X 6 Re-election for additional terms
District Court X 4 Re-election for additional terms
UTAH
Supreme Court X First Retention election (10 year term)    
Court of Appeals X general Retention election (6 year term)
District Court X election Retention election (6 year term)
Juvenile Court X >3 years Retention election (6 year term)
after
appointment
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18. South Carolina has an 11 member Judicial Merit Selection Commission that screens judicial candidates and reports the findings to the
state’s General Assembly. Since 1997, the Assembly is restricted to voting only on those candidates found qualified by the Judicial Merit
Selection Commission. However, the nominating commission itself is not far removed from the ultimate appointing body, and cannot be
considered to be nonpartisan as control over member nominations is vested in majority party leadership.  Although most nominating com-
missions contain members appointed by the governor or legislature, no other commissions actually contain the governor or current legisla-
tors who have final approval over the candidates as voting members of the commission.  In contrast, the Judicial Merit Selection Commission
in South Carolina contains 6 current members of the General Assembly appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. State legislators also choose the remaining 4
members of the Commission, which include judges and the lay public.
19. Until the next biennial general election.
VERMONT
Supreme Court X 6 Retained by vote of General 
Assembly (6 year term)
Superior Court X 6 Same
District Court X 6 Same
VIRGINIA
Supreme Court X(L) 12 Reappointment by legislature
Court of Appeals X(L) 8 Reappointment by legislature
Circuit Court X(L) 8 Reappointment by legislature
WASHINGTON
Supreme Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Court of Appeals X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Superior Court X 4 Re-election for additional terms
WEST VIRGINIA
Supreme Court X 12 Re-election for additional terms
Circuit Court X 8 Re-election for additional terms
WISCONSIN
Supreme Court X 10 Re-election for additional terms
Court of Appeals X 6 Re-election for additional terms
Circuit Court X 6 Re-election for additional terms
WYOMING
Supreme Court X 1 Retention election (8 year term)
District Court X 1 Retention election (6 year term)
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SOURCE: American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States, (April 2002), availible at 
<http://www.ajs.org/js/Jud%20Sel%20Chart%20-%20Apr%202002.pdf>. Reprinted with permission.
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Page 4, EDMUND B. FITZGERALD with
which PATRICK W. GROSS has asked to be
associated.
The statement strongly recommends
expanding the use of judicial nominating
commissions based on perceived equity, as
well as a broad spectrum of successful 
current practices. It notes, however, some
states many not wish to follow this proce-
dure, and in these cases judicial elections
should be publicly funded.
But public funding would not address
many of the shortcomings of judicial elec-
tions identified in this report: they may only
be a crutch, one with severe implementation
problems. This is a far less desirable out-
come and we should hesitate to embrace it.
Memorandum of Comment, Reservation, or Dissent
OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
For 60 years, the Committee for Economic
Development has been a respected influence
on the formation of business and public
policy. CED is devoted to these two objectives:
To develop, through objective research and
informed discussion, findings and recommenda-
tions for private and public policy that will contrib-
ute to preserving and strengthening our free society,
achieving steady economic growth at high employ-
ment and reasonably stable prices, increasing pro-
ductivity and living standards, providing greater
and more equal opportunity for every citizen, and
improving the quality of life for all.
To bring about increasing understanding by
present and future leaders in business, government,
and education, and among concerned citizens, of the
importance of these objectives and the ways in which
they can be achieved.
CED’s work is supported by private volun-
tary contributions from business and industry,
foundations, and individuals. It is independent,
nonprofit, nonpartisan, and nonpolitical.
Through this business-academic partner-
ship, CED endeavors to develop policy state-
ments and other research materials that
commend themselves as guides to public and
business policy; that can be used as texts in
college economics and political science courses
and in management training courses; that
will be considered and discussed by newspaper
and magazine editors, columnists, and com-
mentators; and that are distributed abroad to
promote better understanding of the Ameri-
can economic system.
CED believes that by enabling business
leaders to demonstrate constructively their con-
cern for the general welfare, it is helping busi-
ness to earn and maintain the national and
community respect essential to the successful
functioning of the free enterprise capitalist
system.
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